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Summary findings
Okrasa  analyzes  lhow the  incidenice of  household  If the  share  of family  allowances  in total  household
endowments  and the  allocatioii  of  social benefits  affect  income  were  reduced  by I percent,  for examiiple, the
families'  transitions  into  and  oUt of poverty.  average  length  of poverty  would  be increased  by roughly
Using panel  data  for  1993-96  from  Poland's  2 percent.  But a 1 percent  change  in unemploymeiit
Household  Budget  Survey,  alnd a framework  based  on  benefits  would  yield a 3 percent  change  in the  average
sample  survival  anaiysis  tech niquies, Okrasa  evaluates  durationi  of poverty.  Differences  in hazard  rates for
how  various  policies  will affect  households  with  specific  various  subgroups  would  be even greater.
characteristics  that  make  them  likely to become  poor  or  Households  in villages were  much  more  likely to fall
to move  out  of poverty  under  different  scenarios  into  poverty  thanl houselholds  in cities and  large towns,
(including  whether  or  not  they  receive  a given amount  of  but  the  poor  in towns  and cities  hlad more  difficulty
a particular  type  of social transfer).  exiting  poverty.
He  also  discusses  hlow nonincoimie sources  of welfare,  There  was generally  less poverty  mobilit)  anionig
such  as savings,  credits,  and  loans,  affect  the  likelihood  households  headed  by public  sector  employees  than
that  families will become  or stop  being  poor.  among  those  headed  by employees  in the  private  sector.
He  concludes  that  family  allowances  and  Families  with  three  or  more  childreii  and  one-parent
unemployment  benefits,  the  two  major  social  programs  families  (and grandparents  with  children)  faced  the
analyzed,  have  significant  but  different  effects on  greatest  risk of being  poor;  single-person  houiseholds  and
different  groups  of households  (characterized  in terms  of  childless  married  couples  were  the  least endanigered.
the age,  gender,  marital  status,  and educational  Small  nuclear  families  withi one or  two  children  and
attainment  of the  head of  household;  the  size, type,  families  without  children  fell between  these  two
location,  and  sector  of employment  of the  family or  extremes.
household;  and the  year  in which  the  household  fell into
poverty).
This paper  - a product  of Poverty  and Human  Resources,  Development  Research  Group  - is part of a larger effort  in the
group  to  analyze  the  dynamics  of  poverty  and  the  effectiveness  of  the  safety  net.  The  study  was funded  by the  Bank's
Research  Support  Budget  under  the  research  project  "Household  Welfare  Change  during  the Transition"  (RPO  681-21).
Copies  of this paper  are available  free from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Street,  NW, Washinlgton,  DC 20433.  Please contact
Sheila Fallon, room  MC3-558,  telephone  202-473-8009,  fax 202-522-1153,  email addresssfalloni(t  worldbatnk.org.  Policy
Research  Working  Papers  are also posted  on the Web  at http://www.worldbank.org/research/wotkiingpapers.  Tfhe author
may  be contacted  at wokrasa(aworldbank.org.  November  1999.  (67 pages)
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paper  are  entirely  those  of  the  authors.  7hey d(o  no(lt  nrecessarily represenit  the  view  of  the  World  Ba1ok,  its  txecutiv'e  [)ircctlors.  or the
countrics they represent.




1818 H Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20433
E-mail: wokrasa(worldbank.org
This  paper is a product  of the research  project  RPO 681-21supported  by the Research  Committee
of the World Bank. The author gratefully  acknowledges  this support as well as contributions  from the
Development  Research  Group (DECRG)  and from the Social  Protection  Board  of the Human Development
Network  (HDNSP).  The data used in this study  come  from the Household  Budget  Survey,  conducted  by the
Central Statistical  Office of Poland (GUS).  The Institute  of Economic  Science of the Polish Academy  of
Sciences  (INE-PAN)  was instrumental  in organizing  the data from GUS. Helpful  comments  were received
from  participants in several  World Bank seminars,  in particular  Emmanuel Jimenez,  Martin  Ravallion,
Michal Rutkowski, Branko Milanovic. Carlos Cavalcanti and Erzo Luttmer provided useful comments. In
addition, Carlos Cavalcanti helped in preparation of the executive summary.The Dynamics of Poverty and the Effectiveness of Poland's Safety Net (1993-96)
Executive Summary
This executive summary presents the main findings of this paper, focusing on the results
and on the country context.  T'he estimates and the methodology are presented in the body of the
paper.  The analysis presented in the paper is based on the construction of a four-year panel data
set (from  1993 to 1996) from the Polish Household Budget Survey conducted annually by Central
Statistical Office.  The data is used to examine the role of social policies in mitigating long-term
poverty during  the period  of economic  recovery and  growth. Two interconnected  key  policy
issues emerge from this analysis: how the incidence of household endowments and the allocation
of social benefits affect families' transition in and out of poverty. Specifically,  (i) what are the
chances of escaping from poverty, and what is the risk of falling into poverty? (ii) how effective
have social transfer been in preventing long-term poverty?
The  Polish  economy  is  its  eighth  year  of  economic  expansion,  combining  strong
economic growth (the fastest in central Europe) and significant declines  in inflation.  Real GDP
growth has averaged 5% since 1992, and inflation has declined from 70% in end-91 to just  under
10% by end-98.  While this period of sustained economic expansion has allowed Poland to be the
first country  in Central and Eastern Europe to surpass pre-transition (1989) GDP levels, it has
also  been  marked  by  high  incidence of  persistent  poverty.  Indeed,  42  percent  of all  poor
experienced poverty for three or four years between 1993 and 1996.  As many as two-thirds of all
poor,  and  almost one-third  of the  population, were  poor for  more than  one  year  during  this
period.'
Previous  poverty  studies  for  Poland  made  no  distinction  between  those  who  are
temporarily poor and those who constitute the chronically poor.  In making this distinction, the
report allows the reader to understand trends in poverty dynamics and how households transition
in  and  out  of  poverty  in  Poland.  In  addition,  this  provides  the  opportunity  to  assess  the
effectiveness of existing social policies in reducing long-term poverty.
Poverty Profile
What accounts for this pattern of long term poverty?  There are certain characteristics
that  are clearly associated to  long term poverty.  These include households headed by  persons
with low educational achievement, households with many (3+) children, and households headed
by  single parents. This  poverty profile that  emerges from the  previous  report (Okrasa,  1999)
concords with  expectations  (suggested  also  by  'static'  poverty-based analyses  -- World Bank
1995, 1999) that long term poverty in Poland is predominately rural and more prevalent among
children. Two factors did account for this  profile: the low level of educational achievements of
heads  of households in rural  areas and the  large number of dependents (mostly children).  [In
general, since many of the characteristics of long term poor households are typical of households
living  in  rural  areas,  it  is  not  surprising  that  households  in  rural  areas  account  for  a
disproportionately high share of the long term poor.] While the social safety net was increasingly
*  In this section are also mentioned some of the results discussed  in Okrasa (1999) as this report was
envisioned  as a complementary  to the previous  one.
'  See Okrasa  (1  999) for details.
2  The fact  that the UNDP  poverty  index for industrial  countries  (HPI-2) uses long-term  unemployment  as
the only indicator  of "social exclusion"  illustrates  the difficulty  of getting  statistical  measures  of persistent
poverty.able to capture the long term poor during the four year period,  16 percent of poor households fell
between the cracks (around 700,000 households).
How important were household characteristics in determining the risk of falling in,
or the chance of raising out of poverty? The influence of household characteristics on the risk
of falling into chronic poverty during this period were found to be the following 3:
*  The age of the head of household inversely affected the risk of falling into the poverty
zone, declining with each additional year of the head's age. While in poverty, however,
the families headed by persons aged  51-65 had the lowest chances  of exiting poverty.
This may reflect their inability to take advantage of retraining opportunities, get a new
job, or relocate to find a new or better-paying job.
*  Educational  achievement.  The  level of  education  achieved  by  the  household  head
strongly  affected  the  household's  poverty  status  over  time.  When  compared  to
households  headed  by  holders  of  a  university  diploma  (a  reference  categorV1),  other
households faced risk of falling into poverty that was above three times higher.  Among
the poor,  for every ten households  headed by  university  diploma holders that  left the
poverty  zone,  there  were  only  six  households  with  heads  with  any  other  level  of
education who did the same.
*  Type of household (family).  A firm pattern emerged from the comparison of the risk (the
hazard function) between the households of different compositions. Families with three
or more  children  and  one-parent  families  (and  grandparents with  children)  faced  the
greatest risk of being poor while single-person households and childless married couples
were the least endangered. Small nuclear families, with one or two children, and families
without children fell in between of these two extremes. Among the poor, the same types
of families faced the lowest chances of exiting poverty -- in exactly the same order. The
size of the household was also found to increase the risk of falling into poverty, even after
controlling  for  household  composition  and  location.'  However,  poor  single-person
households were fairly diverse with this respect depending on the marital status of the
householder.
C  Marital status and gender. The marital status and gender of the head of the household
had  a  relatively  lower  impact  on  households'  poverty  status  over  time,  although
households headed by females, divorcees and widowers faced a somewhat greater risk of
falling  into  poverty.  But  this  impact  depended  also  on  the  household  member
composition.  For instance, among  householders  of the  poor single-person  households,
those who had never married had the highest chances of escaping from poverty, while
those who were widowed had the lowest probability. At the same time, the households of
3Details  are in Okrasa  (1999).
4  Household  heads with no diploma  or only an elementary  school  diploma  faced the highest risk of being
permanently  poor (rather  than never being poor). The risk was 35 times higher when  compared  to the risk
faced  by university  graduates.
5 The odds  of falling  into poverty  increased  by 1.28  times  for each additional  person in the household. Two
additional  persons made the household 1.63 times more likely to be chronically  poor.  Also, when one
accounts  for location,  rural households  were more  vulnerable  than urban households  of identical  size. The
only exception  is for very large households  (5.5 persons  or more), where urban households  were more
vulnerable  than rural  households.
iiwidowed people had the  smallest risk of falling  into poverty  while the households of
people who had never been married had the highest risk of being impoverished.
What other factors were important in determining the risk of falling and remaining
in poverty?  Other factors that were important in determining the risk of falling and remaining in
poverty include the following:
L  Location of the household.  Although the chance of avoiding poverty did not vary
significantly  according to  the  location  of  the  household,  there  was  a  significant
difference in the probability of falling into chronic poverty and remaining in chronic
poverty.  Households  in villages were  much more likely to fall  into povertythan
households in cities and  large towns.  However, the poor in cities and  large towns
faced greater difficulties in exiting poverty, signaling the potential risk of creating an
"urban underclass".
*  Sector of employment of  the household.  The sector  of employment of the head of
household was defined as either the public or the private sectors throughout the entire
period  under  study.  Poor  households  headed  by  private  sector  employees  had  a
slightly higher chance of escaping poverty, although this advantage was statistically
significant  only  after  accounting  for  unemployment  compensations.  Also,  their
relative risk  of falling into poverty was lower  after accounting  for unemployment
compensation and family benefits.  This discrepancy between the exit rates  into and
out of poverty among  households headed by the public-sector employees  indicates
that there was generally less poverty mobility in this group.
*  The year in which the householdfell  into poverty.  The year in which a household fell
into poverty yields two types of information.  The overall health of the economy and
the stage of development  of the country's  social safety net.  This in turn translates
into the relative risk of either falling into or exiting poverty.  For those in poverty, the
later a household entered the poverty zone, the harder it was to leave poverty.  For
instance, households that began their poverty spell in 1995 found it twice as hard to
move out of poverty as those impoverished  in  1994 (a reference year), and it was
three  times  harder  to  exit  poverty  for  those  who  began  poverty  in  1996.
Analogously, households that avoided poverty until 1995, found that the relative risk
of falling into poverty was about eight times lower than those who fell into poverty in
1994.
111Social Transfers
What  was  the  redistributive  impact  of  social  transfers? 6 Social  transfers  had  a
positive redistributive  impact during the transition period.  This follows an overall increase  in
inequality during the early years of transition, when there was suddenly greater concentration of
transfers  on  old-age  pension benefits  (Milanovic,  1998).  However, during  the  period  under
analysis there was a trend toward better targeting. This trend is attributed to benefits other than
pensions,  since  the  distribution  of old-age  pension  benefits  remained  practically  unchanged
during the period. 7
What accounts  for this shift  in the redistributive impact of social  benefits? As in
other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the objectives of the social transfer system under
central planning did not include poverty alleviation. However, poverty increasingly became a key
policy concern, especially as the early transition reforms were seen as adversely effecting large
segments of the population.  In 1993 the Labor Fund and Social Assistance programs were the
only  truly  means-tested  benefits  (the  beginning  of  the  period  under  study).  These  were
subsequently supplemented by a series of laws aiming at tying some existing universal benefits,
including  most  of  the  programs  labeled  here  family  allowances  and  unemployment
compensations, to the  actual needs  of the poor and vulnerable. In particular,  the eligibility  to
unemployment  compensations  was  gradually  tightened  and  the  effective  replacement  rate
lowered.
Also, social benefits were increasingly better targeted (in a way comparable with other
countries in the region, Rutkowski, ed., 1999 and Milanovic 1998b). 8 Social benefits  accounted
on  average  for  one-quarter  of  income  of  chronically  poor  households  during  this  period,
compared to  a  5 percent  share in the  income of non-poor. Among  the  social benefits,  family
benefits and unemployment compensation constituted the largest shares of transfers to the poor,
exhibiting an upward linear trend that was similar to total benefits (Figure 1).  More importantly,
their contribution to the income of the chronically poor increased along with the number of years
that  the  households spent in  poverty.  It rose from  about 2.5 percent  to about  10 percent of
6 The following  programs  provided  social  transfers  to households  in Poland  in 1993-96:  (a) family  benefits,
including child-related  allowances such as the maternity allowance, the child-rearing allowance, an
allowance for a  dependent child; (b) care allowances  that supplement  either invalidity or retirement
pensions  (for a non-working  family  member);  (c) other  family  allowances,  including  birth grants,  state-paid
alimony,  and some assistance  allowances  such as sickness  benefits  for the unemployed  or alimony for an
adult member (for brevity, labeled from now on "other benefits"); (d) unemployment  benefits, which
includes unemployment  compensation  (their major component) and subsidies to  unemployed people
starting enterprises;  and (e) miscellaneous  local benefits,  which include a variety  of locally or centrally
administered  benefits in cash or in-kind  such as state or charity  support  to the poor,  transportation  tickets,
and partial payment of daycare center fees.  Because  most of them are administered  locally, they are
labeled  from  now on, as "local  benefits."
7 The Gini coefficient  for the households  that received  pensions  equaled  0.39 over  the whole  period,  while
the coefficient  for all households  was 0.68. At the level of individuals,  the values oscillated between
0.25and  0.24 for pensioners  and 0.83 for all individuals  in the sample.  All of these figures  were calculated
on the basis  of annual  cross-sectional  data.
8 Above 20 percent of the total  social  assistance  went to the lowest  decile, similar  to Bulgaria  (22.3 %) and
Hungary (27 %)  but lower than in Estonia (35 %) -- see Rutkowski.  M., (ed., 1999)  and Milanovic
(I 998b).
ivdisposable income in the case of family allowances, and from 2 percent to 8 percent of disposable
in the case of unemployment compensations.
Indeed, there is a positive association between the number of year spent in poverty and
the number of years receiving social benefits (Figure 2).  This association  is stronger for family
benefits, which are the most important component of income for households experiencing poverty
for  a  prolonged  period  of  time.  The  association  is  not  as  strong  for  unemployment
compensations, is less significant for other benefits, and simply non-significant for local benefits.
It  is important to  note, however, that the  poverty mitigating impact  of these  benefits  differed
between  urban  and  rural  households.  Unemployment  compensations  had  a  stronger  poverty
mitigating effect on urban than on rural households, while family benefits had stronger effect on
rural than on urban households.
Figure  1: Share  of income  from social  benefits  Figure  2: Average  number  of years
in household  disposable  income,  by number  of  of receiving  benefits,  by number  of
years in the poverty  zone  years  in the poverty  zone.
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Another way to examine the poverty mitigating effect of social benefits  is to ask what
would  have happened to vulnerable households  in case they  had  not received  social benefits.
Estimates for the 1993-96 period finds that 14 percent of households that were never poor would
have fallen  into the poverty  - some of them  for as long as three  or four years.  One-third of
households who experienced poverty for one year would have stayed in poverty for at least one
additional  year.  Social  benefits,  therefore,  prevented  at  least  one  out  of  seven  families
(households) from falling into poverty, and reduced the length of time that poor households spent
in the poverty zone by about one year.
vWhat was the impact of social benefits in reducing the time spent in poverty?  The
impact of social benefits on reducing the length of poverty spell was significant but not dramatic
(at  least as far  as median of  the poverty  spell  distribution  was  used).  When benefit-derived
consumption  was not taken  into account, the median length of the poverty spells increased  by
about four months (from 22 to 26 months), or about 20 percent.  This means that a change of one
percent in household disposable income due to an increase in social benefits would reduce the
average time spent in poverty by nearly 2 percent.  To reduce the average poverty spell to no
longer than  one year  (or by  45  percent),  social benefits  would have  to  increase by  about  13
percent.
Also, when only the recipients of benefits are taken into consideration, estimates indicate
that an increase in the share of unemployment compensations in household disposable income has
a slightly greater impact on reducing poverty spells than analogous change in family benefits.  A
one- percent increase in unemployment compensations would reduce the average poverty spell by
3 percent, against a 2 percent reduction  in poverty spell that a one- percent increase in family
benefits  would  yield.  One  important  reason  for  this  difference  is  that  the  unemployment
compensations  were better  targeted  and  accounted  for  a  higher  share  of recipient's  income.
Unemployment compensation accounted for about 11 percent of recipient's  income, compared to
about 5 percent for family benefits.
What was the impact of social benefits in assisting families exit or avoid falling into
poverty?  Social benefits played an important role in helping families exit poverty, but had less
impact  in  preventing  families  from  falling  into  poverty.  Figure  3  shows  the  cumulative
conditional probability that a family exited poverty after being in poverty for a given period.  In
the absence  of social benefits,  the rate  of exit out of poverty  would fall  dramatically  among
vulnerable groups, including all types of families.
Figure 3 also shows that, among the poor, the lowest poverty exit rate was for families
with three or more children, followed by "other" families with children (including single-parent
families and grandparents with children). At the other extreme, the group of households that was
best  placed  to  exit  chronic  poverty  was  married  couples  without  children  and  single-person
households.  Small nuclear families (with one or two children) and families without children fell
in between these two extremes.
viFigure 3: Hazard Function for Exiting Poverty with and without Social Benefits, by Type of
Family
Hazard  w/ benefits  by  type of  family  Hazard  wit benefits  by  type of  family
3.0  7
//2
2.5_ - - - - --_-------6  _  _  <___  '  _,j/5-_4-
2.0  . _  /--#  7  -/  - ''--g-r---  Type of family  /  /5  Type of family
2  Single  peronii  4HH
.7 J/<  /  '  Sngepen;onHH  4  __  _---------------  ~_----  2  Single person HH
1.5,  ---------- 4Otherfrirc  - - -3  4  OtherfaniF  vetchi
, O--  therfamrrd drchiy  /  ;Orfamlvchil
/  6-  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2
1.0,  _ _  t  s  60Mamed  and  3ocrrmor  2j  2.  v  --  -____  6,Mamaed  and  3 or mor
I_Mamedand1-2cNI  v  3. E  - _ _  _  A  _  _  _  _  __r.  Mamed  and  1-2  chlii
.SIn  ,  ,  '  Mamied  couple  vAtc  a  --.- r- .-- fi--4i  -f6  Mamer3co.:24  a  c  0  r . ]Mariedcouplevwtc
1---  2~~~~~  -----  7 
Poverty spell (completed & nght cens,ored)  Povetty spell
Figure  4  shows the  cumulative  probability  of falling  into  poverty  once  benefits  are
withdrawn.  In the absence of social benefits, the spread between the cumulative probabilities of
falling  into poverty  increased among the different  family types.  Families with three  or more
children and single-parent families saw their risk of falling into poverty increase the most, while
single-person households and childless married couples saw the smallest increase.  Small nuclear
families and families without children again fell in between these two extremes.
Figure  4:  Hazard Function  for  Falling  into  Poverty  with  and  without  Counting  Social
Benefits, by Type of Family
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viiHow  was  the  impact of benefits  on households'  transition  in and  out  of poverty
differentiated  across  the  regions?  The  regional  variation  in  the  poverty  exit  rate  was
significantly affected by social benefits. Figure 5 shows that households in central regions have
on average gained more than  southern and eastern regions  in terms  of an increased chance of
raising out of the poverty (as demonstrated by the differences in the cumulative hazard function
between  the  situations  'with'  and  'without'  counting  social  benefits,  respectively,  for  each
region). The figure also shows that the regions are much more differentiated with respect to the
households'  risks of falling  into poverty than their chances of exiting poverty (both 'with'  and
'without'  social benefits). For instance, households in North region are generally less endangered
by poverty than households in eastern regions (especially, in Central East).
How many households that fell into poverty were not captured by the social safety
net?  One-fifth of the households in the sample reported not receiving any benefits (not counting
pensions) during the four year  period studied. Among these households, an astonishingly  high
rate,  29.7 percent,  spent  some time  in  poverty:  14 percent  experienced  one-year  poverty,  9
percent experienced two-year poverty, 4 percent experienced three-year poverty, and 2.7 percent
experienced four-year poverty.  The households that fell between the cracks of the  social safety
net (the non-recipient poor) were concentrated in rural  areas (65 percent),  and about the  same
fraction (62 percent) constituted the households headed by persons with no school diploma (62
percent).  There was also an overrepresentation of households headed by one-parent families and
large families with children.
What factors besides the social safety net helped mitigate long term poverty?  Two
factors besides the social safety net contributed toward mitigating the risk of poverty and, to a
lesser extent, repeated poverty for some households:
Figure 5. Differences in Cumulative  Hazard Function with  and without Counting  Social
Benefits for Poverty Exit and Poverty Entry by Regions
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viiiOwnership offinancial  and physical  assets, as well as access to credit.  Households that
possessed financial assets, durable goods, or had access to credit, were better able to stay out of
poverty.  Households  with  saving accounts  were  less  vulnerable  and  more  likely to  remain
outside poverty than those without savings accounts.  Households that possessed durable goods
did sell some of these  when they  slipped  into poverty.  Households that  borrowed or bought
consumer  goods on  credit  were  better  able to  smooth consumption,  even  during  periods  of
hardship.  Indeed, the incidence of such transactions correlates significantly with chronic poverty
and vulnerability,  suggesting that these households took advantage of credits and loans -- both
from commercial and private sources -- to maintain their current level of consumption rather than
to augment their stock of assets.
Inter-household transfers. Most of the households were part of a larger kinship network,
protecting them against repeated poverty and vulnerability in similar way as savings.  Fifty-six
percent of these households received a gift from another household, and 64 percent donated gifts
to members of other households at least once during the four years in question.  Not surprisingly,
households that belonged to such networks faced significantly less danger of falling into chronic
poverty.  Inter-household  transfers, however,  did not replace  public transfers.  Inter-household
transfers were important in preventing a recipient family from falling into poverty, while public
social transfers had a stronger impact on increasing a household's chances of exiting poverty.
In general, both savings and credits as well  as inter-household transfers,  showed to  be
more significant in preventing families and individuals from falling into poverty than  in helping
the poor exit poverty (reflecting the fact that the poor are typically assetless). The public social
transfers had, on the contrary, a decisively stronger impact on increasing a household's  chances
of exiting poverty (reflectingl the fact that they constitute relatively larger part of the budget of
those already in poverty).
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NET (1993-96)
INTRODUCTION
The analysis in this paper is based on the construction of a four-year panel data set (from
1993  to  1996)  from  the  Polish  Household  Budget  Survey  conducted  annually  by  Central
Statistical Office. The data were used to examine the key policy issues -- changes in the relative
economic positions of Polish households 9 and the role of social policies in addressing long-term
poverty during the period of economic recovery and growth.
Although social policy  in Poland does not yet recognize the temporal heterogeneity of
need,'° it is essential to take this distinction into account in any comprehensive assessment of the
performance of the existing  safety net. In particular,  it is relevant to  show the major types of
social benefits  -- broadly  defined family allowances  and unemployment  compensation -- have
been performing in terms of moving the poor out of poverty or preventing vulnerable households
from falling into the poverty zone. These two benefit programs account for the  overwhelming
majority of social insurance spending after excluding pensions (which counted for three-quarters
of total cash social transfers). Since 1993, cash social spending has absorbed about one-fifth of
Poland's GDP." 1
The paper does not analyze pensions despite the fact that they constituted nearly three-
quarters of all social spending (which, in total, absorbed one-fifth of GDP) during the period 1993
to  1996. The reason for this is that a pension is a  long-term benefit awarded on the basis of a
person's  work history rather than a benefit of a limited duration given in response to a poverty-
causing event or household characteristic. However, households headed by pensioners (either old-
age  pensioners  or  disability  benefits  recipients)  are  included,  and  no  type  of  household  is
excluded from the analysis. 12
As no "dynamic" evaluation of the performance of these programs has been attempted so
far, most of the ongoing debate on the current Polish social insurance system has concentrated on
two  types of deficiencies.  On the  input  side, the  employers'  premium  is the  main  source of
funding for the system (constituting 45 percent of total payroll of a company since  1992)'3 This
means that, practically, the system lacks a sound financial foundation, which  in turn results  in
9 They  are discussed  in a more  detailed  way in a separate  paper (Okrasa,  1999).
1'  This  is also  the case in most of OECD  countries.  For example,  of those countries  in the G-7 group, only
in France does social policy explicitly  recognizes  the distinction  between  the temporarily  poor and the
long-term  poor (Duncan  et al, 1993).
" This level of social  spending  is twice  as high as before  the transition  (9.4 percent  of GDP in 1988).  It is
also higher  than equivalent  outlays  on benefits  in other  Central  and Eastern  European  countries  and in most
OECD countries  with only France with 21 percent and the Netherlands  with 24.8 percent being bigger
spenders  (OECD,  1998).
12Also, as they are related  neither  to a need principle  nor to a welfare-relevant  characteristic  of households,
pensions  are expected,  on the basis of the results  in Part 1,  to have a much smaller  effect on poverty  status
over time than either unemployment  or family benefits. The same is suggested by other studies, for
instance,  van de Walle et al (1994)  on the impact  of social  benefits  in Hungary.
13 This is the employers' contribution  to the social security  fund (ZUS). In addition,  they have to pay 3
percent  of their payroll  to the Labor Fund  and 0.  1  8 percent  to another  benefit  fund.overburdened state budget. On the outcome side, the system is criticized for failing to achieve its
redistributive and insurance objectives (see OECD, 1998).
The object of special interest in the paper relates to the fact that, for the most part, the
different facets of the system have either  been held  over from the pre-transition era14 or have
essentially  been  "modernized"  in an  ad  hoc  fashion.'5 Although  the  safety net  in Poland  is
considered to be better at protecting the poor in general than those in many other countries in the
region  (Grootaert  and  Braithwaite,  1998;  Milanovic,  1  998b;  Rutkowski,  1999)  this  paper
supports the view (which predominates among policymakers and  experts  in Poland) that  it is
necessary to take a more structural approach to reforming public spending programs. Only then
will it be possible to ensure that these programs are fully oriented towards reducing the length of
time that poor spent in poverty.
From a social policy standpoint, there is a need to know the extent to which variation in
household poverty patterns over time  is ceteris paribus  due  to the benefits  allocation scheme
compared to the extent to which it is due to the heterogeneity among households in terms of their
capacity to deal with idiosyncratic shocks to their incomes. The latter issue was dealt with in the
previous paper (Okrasa  1999), which  searched for the determinants of chronic poverty without
taking social policy interventions into account. While the effect of differences in the receipt of
transfers among a given category of households will be discussed in the next subsections.
Both of these aspects of the evaluation of the safety net performance are addressed within
a framework that integrates the dynamics of poverty and social benefit receipts with the fact that
households  have  different needs  and  risk-coping capabilities. This  framework is presented  in
diagram form below.
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The analysis  presented in this paper  was conducted as follows.  The impact  of social
benefits  was assessed  first  in  terms  of the  parameters  of  survival  analysis  such as  survival
14  For instance,  such as traditional orientation  of social programs  on the so-called  major socioeconomic
groups,  rather  than on actual needs of families and individuals  (treated, consequently,  in a way not fully
compatible  with  the principle  of equity  -- Okrasa,  1988).
15  This was particularly  noticeable  in the series of legislative  acts devoted  to the pension  indexation  system
-- which changed it from a price-based  to a wage-related  system -- or in the initial implementation  of
unemployment  benefits, which (before being reformed during 1992-1993)  provided a  disincentive  to
working.
2function, the hazard rate, and the average time of remaining in poverty. Next, the demographic
characteristics of a household that may determine its poverty status over time (together with some
economic  and behavioral  variables)  were included  into the  regression analysis  that  aimed  to
identify the main risk factors  of a household's poverty status over time.  In the last part of the
paper, the role played by non-income sources of welfare (such as whether the household has a
savings account or access to formal or informal credit and loans) is discussed. [The issue of assets
holding is largely neglected in research on poverty, not only in the case of Poland but in all of the
other post-socialist economies  in transition, and  is only  touched on  here  in order to  show its
importance in helping households to cope with risk.]  6
16 Aggregate  saving  in the transitional  economies  is much better  recognized  in the literature  as being largely
determined  by policy choices  represented  by the "aggregate liberalization  index" developed  by de Melo,
Denizer,  and Gelb  (1996).
3PART I: SOCIAL TRANSFERS AND TEMPORAL ASPECTS OF POVERTY
Introduction
Poverty  reduction  strategies  are  typically  designed  and  evaluated  on  the  basis  of
information about households and, particularly, about the poor, covering a time period limited to
one  year (which  is a  standard reference  period for  cross-sectional  data). However, there  is a
growing awareness among policymakers and analysts that allocating adequate available resources
to  poor  requires  that  those  who  remain  in  poverty  from  one  year  to  the  next  should  be
distinguished from those who only experience poverty occasionally.' 7
Social transfers have  had a redistributive  impact  during the  transition period  but in a
rather counter-intuitive way. It transpires that transfers have been the main reason  why overall
income inequality has  increased in Poland  because of the increased  concentration  of pensions
(Milanovic,  1998a).1 8 Less is known about how well the transfers are targeted.  Comparing the
Gini  coefficients  for all  households  in the  sample (0.59  in  1993 and 0.61  in  1996) with the
coefficients for transfer recipients only (0.54 and 0.50 respectively) would suggest that there was
a trend towards better targeting during 1993-96 compared to the previous few years. This trend
should be attributed to  benefits other  than pensions,  as the  distribution  of pensions remained
practically  unchanged  during  that  period.' 9 Compared  to  other  countries,  in  terms  of  social
assistance being received by the lowest decile, Poland  (20.5 percent) is -- together with Bulgaria
and Hungary -- somewhere between Russia (8.2 percent) and Estonia (34.7 percent;  Milanovic,
1998b, Rutkowski, 1999).
As in all of the countries of Eastern Europe, the objectives of the social transfer system
under  central  planning  did  not  include  the  alleviation  of  poverty.  However,  poverty  has
increasingly become a key  policy concern as the early  reformns  were  seen to  have an adverse
effect on large segments of the population. The Labor Fund and Social Assistance programs were
the  only truly means-tested  programs that  existed in 1993 (the beginning  of the period under
study).  They were subsequently supplemented by a series of laws that aimed to tie some existing
universal-type  benefits,  including  most  of  the  programs  labeled  here  family  allowances  and
unemployment  benefits,  to  the  actual  needs  of  the  poor  and  vulnerable.  In  particular,
unemployment  benefits have undergone a spectacular evolution from being excessively  liberal
(when they were introduced  in 1990) to the version that prevailed during  1993-96, which  had
tighter  eligibility  criteria  and  a  lower  effective  replacement  rate.  These  changes  are  briefly
discussed in the next sub-section.
However, the performance of the safety net with regard to long-term poverty still remains
to be assessed (Ruggles and  Williams, 1989; Hill,  1992; and Jalan and Ravallion,  1998). This
paper  addressed  this  problem  counter-factually  by  asking:  What  would  have  happened  to
households if they had not received a given type of benefit? Taking a micro-simulation approach
"' Analysts  typically  recommend  adopting  cash  transfer  programs  aimed  at the temporarily  poor and special
support  programs  to alter  the long-term  economic  outlook  of those who tend to remain  poor from one year
to the next  (see Hill, 1992).
is Transfers  contributed  to inequality  during  the transition  more  than they did before  the transition.  In 1995,
they contributed  almost  as much as income  from wages  and  salaries  did (Milanovic,  1998).
19 The Gini coefficient  for the households  that  received  pensions  equaled  0.39 over  the whole  period,  while
the coefficient  for all households  was 0.68. At the level of individuals,  the values oscillated  between  0.25
and 0.24 for pensioners  and 0.83 for all individuals  in the sample.  All of these figures  were calculated  on
the basis of annual  cross-sectional  data.
4made  it possible to  generate the appropriate parameters under the assumption that households
were not receiving either family benefits or unemployment compensation or all social benefits
other  than  pensions. The  effectiveness of  each of the  programs  was assessed  by  comparing
estimates of the respective parameters (such as the likelihood of a household leaving the poverty
zone after a given period of time in poverty or of the risk of a household falling into the poverty
zone) with  baseline  estimates representing the  actual situation. The fact that  households have
different capabilities for managing the risk of chronic poverty should also be recognized in this
context. Fortunately, the data used allow for heterogeneity of the sampled households with this
respect.
Panel Data 1993 - 1996
The  data  used  in  the  analysis  came  from  the  Household  Budget  Survey,  which  is
conducted  annually  by  the  Polish  Central  Statistical  Office  (GUS).  The  survey  yields  rich
information on the income, expenditures, and demographic characteristics of households using a
diary system of data collection from a nationwide probability sample of between 31,000 to 32,000
households.
The  Household  Budget  Survey  is a  cross-sectional  survey but  has  an explicit  panel
component (using a split-panel technique, Kordos, 1995). In the rotation of subsamples, exactly
half of the households are surveyed in the same month during a period of four consecutive years.
There were two panel segments used during the period 1992-96, one comprised of the households
that  participated  in the  survey  from  1992  to  1995  and  the  second  comprised  of those  that
participated  in  it  from  1993  to  1996.  Therefore,  the  four-year  panel  1993-96  embraces,
theoretically, about one-quarter of the cross-sectional sample (instead of a half). However, due to
cases  of  non-response  and  to  attrition,  the  effective  size  of  the  four-year  panel  is  4,919
households.
While a typical  annual non-response rate was about 31 percent from  1993 to  1996, the
year-to-year attrition rate was about  12 percent during that period. This amounted to about 38
percent of total attrition among the households that were designated to participate in the survey
from 1993 to 1996. The relatively highest rate of attrition was among the households classified as
self-employed,  while  the  lowest was  among  the  households of farmers.  For example,  during
1995-96, their respective attrition rates were 14 percent and 9 percent (GUS, 1996).
In  order to  indicate  the  direction  of any  possible bias,  one  may  compare  the  cross-
sectional  and  panel  observations  by  various  major  characteristics  and  measures.  Such  a
comparison made in Okrasa (1999) showed that the differences between the cross-sectional and
the  panel data were,  for the  most part,  not  substantial (although,  given the  large  size of the
sample, they were often statistically significant). As expected, the panel data show a tendency to
downward rather than  upward bias in the possible estimates of welfare measures (reflecting the
fact  that  relatively more  affluent households are, on  average,  slightly  less  likely than  poorer
households to continue to participate in the survey over the long term).
Basic Definitions and Background
Poverty Pattern. The full scope of possible situations that any given household may have
faced during the four-year period in question consists of 16 different poverty patterns  that are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive. These are presented in Table A-I in Appendix A. I  1  The table
contains  frequency  distributions  of households  by  poverty  patterns  over  the  four-year  period
under  the  several  alternative  definitions  of consumption  used  in  this  paper  for  determining
household welfare -- with and without counting the household consumption that can be attributed
5to, or derived from: (i) family benefits,  (ii) unemployment benefits, and (iii) all social benefits
other than pensions and disability benefits20
At  first glance, the differences between these distributions were  large enough to prove
that the social welfare  system and each of its major components had a sizable impact on  how
often a household falls in, or how long it stays in poverty.  However, leaving aside for the time
being the assessment of how much social benefit a household receives, it was worth looking first
into the overall effect of incidence of the transfers.
Poverty  Transition.  The transition  in and  out of  poverty  is  unlikely  ever  to  be  a
symmetrical process either in terms of households' abilities to cope with risk or in terms of the
impact of social benefits. For instance, younger  households may be more vulnerable to falling
into poverty but not necessarily  to remaining  in it for a  long period than  older ones.  Also, a
particular type of social benefit may help poor households to lift themselves out of the poverty
zone in a different way than the way in which it helps non-poor vulnerable households to remain
outside of the poverty zone. Therefore, the two temporal aspects of poverty - poverty duration
and poverty avoidance - must be taken into account when evaluating the performance of social
transfers as they are associated both with two types of time-event  observations (the outflow of
households out of poverty and the inflow of households into poverty).
*  Poverty spell: The duration of poverty refers to how long a household has been poor. This
particularly applies to those households that were not poor at the beginning of the period in
question, that became poor at some point during that period, and next either rose back out of
poverty (poverty spell completed during the period of observation) or were still poor at the
end of the period of observation. This analysis can be occasionally extended to also cover the
left censored observations -- how long it takes for a household to rise out of poverty if it was
already poor at the beginning of the observation period.
*  Poverty  avoidance:  The  avoidance  of  poverty  refers  to  the  "survival"  status  of  those
households who were not poor at the beginning  of the period in question.  Their "survival"
meant  as remaining outside  the  poverty zone  constituted  a  complementary  aspect (to the
poverty duration and exit) in assessing the performance of the social safety net.
The distribution of the poverty patterns over time aggregated according to the main types
of possible outcomes (poverty spell completed - poverty spell right censored - poverty spell left
censored  - poverty  spell  double  censored  - remaining  outside  poverty  zone)  by  household
vulnerability status is available from the author (or from the unit).
Vulnerability status  of a  household  was defined  here  in the  same  way as  in Okrasa
(1999):  for a household to be "vulnerable," during the four years in question, there had to have
been a systematic decline in either its income or its consumption (in terms of respective quintiles)
or in just one of these measures if there had been no systematic increase in the other. Altogether,
31 percent of the sampled households was classified as vulnerable.
These two  aspects of poverty  over time  may provide policymakers with a  dilemma  in
designing an effective anti-poverty policy: To what extent  should they focus  on protecting the
poor against remaining in prolonged poverty (for another year or more) as opposed to preventing
vulnerable groups from falling into poverty? Therefore, this  section analyzes in a parallel way
20  The benefit-derived  consumption  was calculated  as the household's  total consumption  per equivalent
adult  multiplied  by a factor equal  to the share of income  from social  benefit  program(s)  in the household's
total disposable  income.
6both of the possibly conflicting objectives (poverty exit and poverty avoidance) talking sometime,
for the sake of brevity, about the context ofpromotion  and the context of prevention, respectively.
Problem of Behavioral Response.
The assumption that a household's  level of welfare as defined without benefit-derived
consumption can, all other things  being equal, be compared to  its actual welfare  also implicitly
assumes  that the effect  of the household's  behavioral responses is not discernible,  and  can be
ignored in the analysis. In general, this  is questionable,  as discussed, for instance, by National
Research Council (1991) or by van de Walle, Ravallion, and Datt (1994), and Atkinson (1998).
When the amount of benefit received by a household or the scope of access it has to benefits is
reduced, the household may compensate itself for the loss by changing its behavior. For example,
it may send more of its members out to work or it may draw  on savings, private transfers, or
credits. 2"
There is some evidence that Polish households have been adjusting their behavior to the
changes  in either  public or private transfers during the transition.  For instance,  increasedjob-
seeking on  the part  of the  unemployed was  observed after restrictions  were  imposed on  the
eligibility,  duration, and level of unemployment benefit  in  1992-93 and  in 1996 (Kalaska and
Witkowski,  1997). Also, there  was some evidence of inter-household  transfers  among  worker
households with transfers going predominantly from relatively better-off to poorer families (Cox,
Jimenez, and Okrasa,  1997) -- which indicates that households do may change their behavior in
response to changes in their benefits.22
Coming up with a fully  satisfactory solution to this  problem - one that would  involve
identifying  the  appropriate  behavioral  response  functions  and  generating  variables  projected
forward in time for each social program - remains beyond the objectives of this study.  Instead, it
was decided to test the robustness of estimates of the survival parameters to the possible effects of
behavioral responses. This was done by  estimating  households'  propensity to  consume out of
their social benefit payments (within an econometric model of consumption).  This estimate was
then  used to  generate  new  household  welfare  values  ("without"  benefits),  which  eventually
yielded different poverty patterns over time to those in Table A- I (Appendix A. The strategy used
here partly followed the strategy that was originally used by van de Walle et al (1994).
The Propensity  to  Finance  Consumption  out  of  Social  Benefits. The  propensity  of
households  to  consume  out of  their  social  benefits  (other than  pensions)  was  estimated  for
consecutive  pairs  of  years  during  1993-96.  The  year-to-year  changes  in  adult-equivalent
consumption were regressed on changes in the household's  income from social benefits and on
lagged social benefits. Also  included in the regression were a set of predictors  representing the
household's  endowments in the basic year t and in terms of changes between t and t + 1, such as:
(i) human capital in terms of the head's educational achievements and age and the household's
composition; (ii) physical assets such as agricultural land or an allotment, durables, or amenities;
and (iii) other characteristics of the household head such as gender, labor status, and sector of
employment. The fixed effect model  was assumed, but the same variables  for the basic years
were included in order to control for the different "initial conditions" (as discussed in Grootaert,
Kanbur, and Oh, 1995). The results of this regression are presented in Table A-2 in Appendix A.
21 Poverty patterns  over time "without"  benefits  were constructed  in the same way as setting households'
propensity  to consume  out of their social  benefits  as equal to unity. However,  some households  may have
been able to save out of their benefits.  However,  due to the fact that pensions  were not included in the
analysis,  the benefits  were simply  not large enough  to allow  households  to save.
22  However, those private transfers that, during the pre-transition  time (according  to data from 1987)
functioned like public means-tested  public transfers, showed a  firm tendency to decline during the
transition  (according  to data from 1992)  -- see Cox et al, 1997.
7In general, households' propensity to finance their consumption out of their lagged social
benefits was practically negligible but was significant with respect to year-to-year changes in the
level of benefits that they received. This propensity varied from 0.58 in 1993-94 to 0.67 in 1994-
95 and to 0.40 in 1995-96. The lower propensity in 1995-96 is consistent with the earlier finding
that social transfers represent a decreasing share of income in the sampled households.
However, the concern about bias in the assessment of the safety net performance was not
so much about the level of propensity to consume out of social benefits (PCOB) in itself . What it
was  important  to  establish  was  whether  the  PCOB  varied  significantly  among  groups  of
households  that  exhibited  different  propensities  to  remain  chronically  poor  - for  instance,
between households that differed in terms of their vulnerability status, locality, or the number of
children  under the age of 15. Therefore, the same model was re-run to estimate the PCOB for
sub-groups of households  divided  according to  these  characteristics,  which  had  already  been
shown to have a significant impact on household poverty status over time.
Contrary to expectations, the values of PCOB in the group of non-vulnerable households
were somewhat higher than average in the sample,  while, among  vulnerable households, they
were much smaller but not statistically significant. No consistent pattern of difference emerged
from  comparing  urban  and  rural  households.  urban  households  had  a  slightly  higher  PCOB
(above the average) during 1993-1994 and  1994-95 than rural households, while in 1995-96, the
PCOB was higher among rural households. There was a rather surprising finding with regard to
households with large numbers of children, which exhibited practically insignificant PCOBs. This
was the case not only for those households with children under the age of 15 but also for those
with children under the age of 18. (Only in the cases of households with three children in 1994-95
and households with four children in 1995-96 were the values statistically significant and above
the average for these periods).
Leaving  aside  the  substantive  interpretation  of  these  differences,  as  well  as  the
information revealed by  other variables'  coefficients, these results  suggested that  vulnerability
status was the only significant factor of a possible bias associated with the behavioral response
effect. Therefore, in assessing whether the safety net is adequately meeting the needs of the long-
term  poor,  it will  be  vital  to  take  into account  the  distinction  between  vulnerable  and  non-
vulnerable households in estimating survival parameters.
Transfer Incidence.
If social transfers contribute to a household's ability to either avoid or rise out of poverty,
then  it could be expected that there  would be a higher incidence of social transfers  among the
poor and vulnerable  households than  among  other households  during the  whole  period being
studied. It would also be reasonable  to expect that  benefits other than  pensions  account for a
larger share of the total disposable income of the poorest households than of less poor or non-
poor households ("more"  and "less" poor refers to the number of years that the household had
spent in poverty).
The  information  presented  in  Figures  1  and  2  below  generally  confirms  these
expectations.  However, before discussing these figures, it is necessary to give a brief review of
the benefits being analyzed. 23
23  Some restrictions  are imposed  on the analysis  by the classification  of social benefits  that was used in the
survey by GUS (the Central Statistical  Office).  For instance,  social assistance  (which has accounted  for
about 8 percent  of social  insurance  since  its introduction  in 1991)  and other  allowances  to the very poorest
are  combined with a  variety of other benefits into one group (the "miscellaneous" category). In
consequence,  this last group  of benefits  will only  occasionally  be included  in  the analysis.
8The following programs provided social transfers  to households in Poland  in 1993-96
(omitting retirement and disability pensions, which are not analyzed in this paper):
*  Family benefits, which  include (a) child-related allowances such as the matemity
allowance, the child-rearing allowance, an allowance for a dependent child, and (b)
care allowances that are a supplement to either invalidity or retirement pensions (for
a non-working family member).
*  Other family  allowances, which  include birth grants, state-paid alimony, and some
assistance allowances such as sickness benefits for the unemployed or alimony for an
adult member  (for brevity, from now  on, these are labeled  "other benefits" or,  in
some exceptional cases, "social assistance").
*  Unemployment benefits,  which  include  unemployment  compensation  (their  major
component) and subsidies to unemployed people starting enterprises.
*  Miscellaneous  ("local")  benefits,  which  include a  variety  of  locally  or  centrally
administered benefits in cash or in-kind such as state or charity support to the poor,
transportation tickets, and partial payment of daycare center fees. Because most of
them are administered locally, they are labeled from now on, as "local benefits."
Figure 1: Share of income from social benefits  Figure 2: Average number of years of receiving
(w/t pensions) in household disposable  benefit, by number of years in the
income, by number of years in the  poverty zone.
poverty zone.
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Practically  none of these  benefit  programs  remained  unchanged  during the  period  in
question  (some  details  about  these  changes  are  in  the  technical  notes).
2 4 "  Because  the  benefits
put  such  heavy  pressure  on  the  central  government  budget  (accounting  for  about  5  percent  of
24 Detailed  descriptions  of social spending  before 1993 can be found in Golinowska  (1994), in Warsaw
School  of Economics  (1994),  and in World  Bank (1994).
9GDP each year since 1993), there have been a series of legislative efforts over the last few years
aimed at reducing both family allowances and unemployment benefits, either by lowering their
levels or by tightening their eligibility criteria. 25 On the other hand, the statistical classification of
social programs that was used in the survey has been improved..'
The share of benefits (other than pensions) in household disposable income per capita -
calculated  as averages over the four-year  period - varied greatly across the welfare  trajectory
categories. According to Figure  I  below, all of these social benefits accounted for  nearly one-
quarter of the income of the poorest households (those that are permanently poor), while the share
among those that had never been poor declined monotonously to about 5 percent.
Family allowances  and  unemployment  compensation constituted the  biggest  shares of
household income, and both exhibited  linear trends that  were similar to the trend exhibited  by
total  benefits. Their  shares increased along with  the number of years that  the households  had
spent in the poverty zone - from about 2.5 to about 10 percent (in the case of family allowances)
and from 2 to 8 percent (in the case of unemployment benefits).
How is the size of the shares associated with transfer incidence?  To some extent, this
depends on what indicators of incidence are used. One way to capture social transfer incidence
over time  is to  use a  series  of zero-one variables  indicating  whether or  not a  household  had
received any income from a given social program during the four-year period. About two-thirds
(63 percent) of the  households received family  benefits for  at least one out of the  four years,
while  one-quarter (26 percent)  received unemployment  compensation and 41  percent received
"local  benefits." Altogether,  four out of five households (79.4 percent)  received at  least some
benefits during one of four years.
According to Figure A-I  in Appendix A, the fractions of households receiving  a given
type of benefit during at least one out of four years tended to grow with the number of years the
households had spent in the poverty zone.  About 60 percent of non-poor households received
family allowances,  while over  80 percent  of the poorest  households received them.  Also, the
fraction of recipients of unemployment benefits ranged from about one-fifth of the non-poor to
about half of the permanently poor. Only "local benefits" were more or less flat across all of the
welfare groups.
A different  aspect of transfer  incidence was illustrated  by the number of years during
which  a  household had  been  receiving  benefits  from  any  program. The  average time  period
during which  households received any type  of social benefit was 2.29 years,  but this  differed
from program to program as follows (with years converted to months and standard deviations in
parentheses):  (i) family benefits  - 21.1 months (19.4); (ii) unemployment benefit - 4.8 months
(9.5); (iii) "local" benefits - 9.7 months (14.2); (iv) other benefits - 0.7 months (3.6).
As shown in Figure 2, these means also differed significantly among the various welfare
groups, especially  in the case of family  benefits, which ranged from about  18 months for non-
poor households to 34 months for the poorest households.  Unemployment benefits ranged from
25 For instance,  a policy  lowering  the maximum  age of children  attending  school  from 25 to 20 years of age
for receipt  of family  allowances  was enacted  at the beginning  of the period in question.  However,  only in
March 1996 was the duration  of the unemployment  benefit adjusted to reflect the average duration of
unemployment  spells. The eligibility  requirements  for the unemployment  benefit have been successively
tightened  since the benefit  was first introduced.  Together  with the reduction  in the duration  of the benefit
noted above,  this lowered  the fraction  of benefit  recipients  among  job-seekers  from as high as 80 percent
before  the period in question  (the highest  being in 1991)  to 30 percent afterwards  (in 1997),  well below  the
OECD average (OECD, 1998). The rate of unemployment  has also successively  declined (from 16.4 in
1993 to 13.6  in 1996).
10about 2.5  for  non-poor households to  9 months for  the poorest households. 26 Unemployment
benefits also differed significantly among different socioeconomic groups and types of families.iv
Since the data revealed that the  length of time that households received social benefits
was typically shorter than the length of time that households spent in chronic poverty, a question
arises about how poverty and the receipt of social benefits are related. For instance, only 38 to 40
percent  of unemployed people  stayed out of work for  longer than  12 months  (Kalaska and
Witkowski, 1997), while nearly two-thirds of the poor spent longer than one year in poverty. This
issue is discussed in the next subsection.
Social Transfer Incidence and Chronic Poverty
In order to answer the question of whether social programs take account of the dynamic
nature of households' welfare, it was first used a proxy indication of whether or not any of the
social programs matched households'  economic status over time during the period in question.2
In particular,  did chronically  poor households receive  benefits  more  frequently  or for  longer
periods  of time than  others?  Also,  how  strongly was the period during  which  the  household
received particular types of benefits associated with the length of time that the household spent in
poverty?
First, the  effect  of social benefits  was examined through comparing  the values of the
coefficients of the regression with years in the poverty as the dependent variable that  was run
under  alternative  definitions  of  consumption  (actual  consumption  and  when  benefit-derived
consumption was not counted). The following variables were used as predictors:  the number of
head's  school years, the number of years during which an unemployed person was present in the
households (during the analyzed period), the number of children under  15, while controlling for
urban-rural distinction and for region (using nine dummies). The results presented in Table A-3a
in Appendix A suggest that the role of the schooling increased (by about  18 percent)  if social
benefits ware not counted.  [For instance, with each year of schooling  of the household  head
lowered, the household would  have stayed for about one-fifth time  longer in poverty  after the
social  benefits were removed  compared to when  social benefits  are  counted -- the  respective
coefficients are -0.148 and -0.175.).] But the most sizeable was the increase of the impact of the
unemployment  incidence  in the household  in the  case when  unemployment  benefit  was not
counted  (by nearly 80 percent), followed by  about one-forth  greater impact of the number of
children in the pre-school age if family benefit was not counted.
Two  measures  of program participation  were  used in the preliminary  examination  of
patterns of social benefits receipts among households with different poverty statuses over time -
(i) the number of social programs from which a household benefited during the four-year period
and (ii) the number of years during which it participated in each program (years-in-program). It
was expected that poorer households, as measured by the length of time they  had spent in the
poverty zone, would be more dependent than other households on social programs.
The results  of regressing the  number of years  in poverty on  the  number of years-in-
program - presented in Table A-3b of Appendix A - were consistent with a tendency to the linear
association between these variables demonstrated by Figures I and 2. The values of the t-statistics
- predominantly positive and highly significant - indicated that households in prolonged poverty
26 The duration  of benefits as approximated  here (all measures  are assumed  to have a one-year  reference
period)  does  not reflect  the actual  duration  of the benefits.
27 The importance  of proxy measures  in assessing  the performance  of a social  program  was demonstrated
by Grosh (1994).
11generally benefited  from more programs and for longer periods of time.  This proved to be the
case  both  when  the  benefits  were  aggregated  and  when  the  major  programs  were  treated
separately,  except  in  the  case  of  "local"  benefits.  The distinctions  between  urban  and  rural
households and between vulnerable and non-vulnerable households made the association between
program participation and the time spent in poverty even clearer.
Family allowances (restricted  here to the  i-aggregate listed above)  appeared to be the
most important component  of the income of households who were experiencing  poverty for a
longer period of time. Unemployment benefits were shown to be slightly  less important in this
respect, followed by the residual category of "other" benefits. Both unemployment and "other"
benefits exhibited more difference between urban and rural households and between vulnerable
and non-vulnerable households than with family allowances.
If a negative association, such as the one shown by local benefits, was significant (which
was significant only in the case of the non-vulnerable households), this suggests that the poor had
less access to these benefits than the non-poor.
Asset Holdings.  The issue of the availability of various resources and the access that
different households have to them requires examining so-called non-income sources of welfare.
Households may not be forced to reduce their consumption, and to fall into poverty if they have
accumulated asset holdings  or borrowed funds. Thus,  it could be expected that  a household's
access to such sources would be inversely related to the number of years it had spent in poverty.
Generally, the patterns of association shown at the bottom of Table A- 3 in Appendix A confirm
this expectation.
The  number  of  years  during  which  a  household  was  able  to  rely  on  its  own  asset
holdings - dissaving or credit from a financial institution - reduced the length of its poverty spells
significantly.  This accords  with the  commonly recognized fact that  poor households  with  no
assets are less likely than other households to have any savings and, therefore, are likely to have
less access to institutional credit. They also have less possibility of borrowing money against their
future labor income than other households as they are more likely to be liquidity constrained. In
contrast to savings and formal credits, the positive and significant association shown by informal
credits suggests that low-income households had been borrowing more extensively from private
(informal) sources than from financial institutions but, as indicated by their welfare status, not in
sufficient amounts to offset the decline in their consumption.Nevertheless,  these private sources
of borrowing tend to play the same role in the lives of poor households as social programs in that
households see them both as a kind of rescue strategy. These tendencies are practically the same
among urban and rural households and among vulnerable and non-vulnerable households.
A more comprehensive, albeit still preliminary, picture of the relationship between social
benefits and poverty status over time was given by the results of regressing the years-in-poverty
on years-in-program, while controlling for each other in a multiple regression model as follows:
Povertyyears  = 0.279 +0 .259(Family_year) + 0.298(Unemployment  vear)
- 000  07(Lcal_year)  + 0.1  *Other_year)
When,  instead of years  of program  participation,  a  set of the  dummy  variables  was
included indicating whether or not a program was used by the household for at  least one out of
four years, the following estimates were obtained:
Povertyyears  0A80)  + 0.299(family  benefit) +  0.605(Unemployment_benefit)
VM  0.07(Local_benefit) + 0.1  88(Other benefit)
12The estimated coefficients of these two equations were fairly consistent with each other.
This suggests that both types of information -- the number of years of receiving benefits and the
fact that a household used the program at least once out of the four years in question -- would
yield  similar  predictions  about  the  length  of the  time  a  household was  likely to  remain  in
poverty. 28 Once  again,  "local"  benefit  incidence had  practically  no  relevance  for  long-term
poverty (as no significant association was shown between it and the number of years in poverty).
The more detailed results of these regressions, presented in Table A-4 in Appendix A,
make it possible to examine  some of the  differences between urban and  rural households and
between vulnerable and  non-vulnerable households. On average, unemployment  benefits had  a
greater impact (in terms of the number of years of receiving benefits and the fact that a household
used  the  program  at  least  once  out  of the  four  years  in  question)  on  urban  than  on  rural
households, while  family benefits  tended  to  affect rural  households  (in the  same terms) to  a
greater  extent  than  urban  households.  However,  these  differences  were  too  small  to  be
generalized. The "local"  and "other"  benefits were either  insignificant  or barely  significant in
terms of the urban-rural distinction.
Urban and rural households (whose shares of social benefits in household welfare were
practically the same) did not differ in terms of how their transfer incidence affected their poverty
status over time. However, the impact was stronger among the vulnerable households (which are
over-represented in rural areas) than among non-vulnerable households.
The fact that vulnerable households received a higher share of their income from social
benefits than other households (taken with the characteristics associated with their vulnerability
status as discussed in the previous section) explains why the number of participation-years in a
program has  a  stronger association  with  the number of years spent in  poverty  in the case  of
vulnerable households. 29
The amount  of transfers  (as opposed to their incidence) was taken  into account in the
calculations  in  the  form  of  an  adjustment  factor  as  described  previously  in  a  footnote  (in
connection with Table  A-1 in Appendix A). The original measure  of welfare (adult-equivalent
consumption)  once transformed by  such an adjustment  factor  generates a  new distribution  of
households on the welfare scale.
It might be expected that the scope of the resulting changes in household positions in the
distribution might be larger among those with bigger portion of consumption  derived from the
benefits. The shares of benefit-derived consumption  in total household-equivalent  consumption
(including,  as  previously,  all  benefits  except  retirement  pensions  and  disability  benefits)  are
presented in Figure A-2 in Appendix A.  These shares increased as the number of years in poverty
increased, which  was also  the  observed trend for the  share of social benefits  in total  income
(Figure 1). The share of benefit-derived consumption in total household-equivalent consumption
was bigger by a factor of five among the permanently poor than among those households that had
never  been  poor. However,  within each  of the year-in-poverty  groups, the  share  - and  the
welfare  impact  of social  benefits - decreased over the period in question.  This observation  is
28 Both models  are statistically significant  (at the level of 0.001).  The t-values  are also significant  for each
coefficient  at the level  0.01, except  for local benefits  which  where  significant  at the level 0.05.
29From 1993  to 1996,  the shares  of benefits  in  household  welfare  (as measured  by the size of social  benefit-
derived  consumption  compared  with total household  consumption  per equivalent  adult)  ranged between  7
and 9 percent  in the case of urban  households  and between  8 and 10 percent in  the case of rural households.
The analogous  numbers  varied  between  11 and 12 percent  among  vulnerable  households  compared  with 5
to  9  percent for non-vulnerable  households. Both of the major programs - family allowances and
unemployment  benefits  - exhibited  this tendency.
13consistent  with the apparent  trend  of declining household dependency  on  income from social
transfers (for example, as might be seen by looking at income composition by poverty pattern and
the high share of earnings in the income of the poorest as discussed in Okrasa, 1999).
Aggregated  social  benefits  (without  pensions)  had  a  significant  effect  in  terms  of
reducing poverty among all groups. This is shown in Figure A-3 in Appendix A, which illustrates
what would have  happened if benefit-derived consumption had  not been accounted  for in the
model. For instance, 15 percent of those households that were never poor would have fallen into
the  poverty  zone  - some  of  them  for  as  long  as  three  or  four  years  - if  benefit-derived
consumption had not been included.  One-third of those households who had experienced poverty
for one year would have stayed in poverty for at least one additional year without  benefits. In
other  words, social benefits  can be  said to have  prevented at  least one  out of seven  families
(households)  from  falling  into  poverty,  while  also  reducing  the  length  of  time  that  poor
households spent in the poverty zone by about a year.
A complementary exercise was conducted, which compared the composition of the social
benefits  received by households with different poverty patterns  over time (results are available
from the  author). When those  households  that  had  never been  poor were  omitted,  the  most
dissimilar patterns of social benefits composition were exhibited by households that fell into and
rose out of poverty during the period in question and those with a double-censored poverty spell
(the permanently  poor plus most of those in recurrent poverty).  The share of benefits  in total
income was  about  twice  as  low  in the  case  of  those  who  either  avoided  poverty  at  all  or
completed  a  poverty  spell  within  the  four-year  period  as the  share  of those  with  a  double-
censored poverty spell. The composition of social benefits received by those who  were already
poor when they entered the study and those who were in the poverty zone at the end of the period
was almost identical. They differed from other groups of households by having a higher share of
unemployment benefits, which indicates that unemployment was the chief cause of their poverty.
14PART II:  THE POVERTY SURVIVAL EFFECT OF SOCIAL BENEFITS
Introduction
In order to assess the effectiveness of the social safety net in preventing households from
falling into poverty and helping the poor to escape from poverty, it was necessary to use a model
that made  it possible to estimate the key quantities that describe the process  offalling  into and
moving out of the poverty zone. Changes in the appropriate parameters of long-term poverty that
can be attributed to social transfers can be used to appraise their impact on the household poverty
status over time. From a policy standpoint, it is important to know what changes have occurred
in: (i) the length of household poverty spells; (ii) the likelihood of exiting poverty after spending
a given length of time in it; (iii) the likelihood of surviving outside of the poverty zone; (iv) the
risk of households falling into poverty; and (v) the risk of households remaining in poverty for a
longer period of time.  For this  purpose,  survival analysis techniques  seemed to  be especially
suitable,  first, because  of the  genuinely  censored nature of  the observations  provided by the
survey  pane]  data 30 and  because  standard  regression  techniques  that  require  "normal"
(uncensored) data would produce biased results.
Model Selection and Assumptions Made
A  two-stage approach was undertaken. The objective  of the first  step was to find  out
whether or not social transfers were meeting the needs of the chronically poor. The second step
involved identifying the factors that were responsible for changing the poverty status of different
groups of households over time.
Social Benefits and Poverty Survival Parameters.  The first stage involved assessing how
social  benefits  affect  the  respective  survival  parameters  listed  above  (from  i  to  v)  under
alternative definitions of household welfare -- with and without counting the consumption derived
from social benefits. At  this stage, social benefits, either aggregated or as individual  programs
taken separately, were assumed to be the only factor responsible for the differences in the poverty
status over time. 31 Thus, the survival function and the hazard rate were the basic quantities used
to describe poverty as a time-to-event phenomenon. The conditional probability that a household
that remained ("survived") in poverty until just  prior to time tjand rose out of poverty at the same
time  interval was the  basic  quantity  from which  estimators  were  constructed  of the  survival
function and the (cumulative) hazard rate as well as of the (partial) likelihood function.v
Remaining at the intuitive  level, the  concrete meaning  of each of these quantities was
provided by the  definition  of the end  event.
3 2 The Life  Tables procedures  were used for  this
30  As is demonstrated  in Table I in Appendix  A, only  some of the poverty  patterns  consisted  of spells  that
had begun  and ended during  the period covered  by the data (most  of them are either right-censored  or left-
censored,  and some are double-censored  observations).
31  In other words, the issue is to analyze the differences  between  the distributions  of poverty patterns
presented  by different  columns  of Table  A-I in Appendix  A. The differences  are envisioned  as the effect  of
changes  that receiving  the benefits  have made in a household's  welfare status over time, in other words,
under the counterfactual  scenarios  that they were not counted in the household consumption  (per adult
equivalent).
32  When the end event is meant to be rising out of poverty, the survival function  represents  the risk of
remaining  in poverty  for another  year or for several  more months  (for computational  convenience,  months
units are used instead  of years).  When the end event is meant  to be falling into poverty  after staying  out of
the poverty  zone,  survival  has its usual denotation.
15purpose (using the SPSS program to do the calculations). For this, three basic variables had to be
constructed  --  a  survival  variable,  a  time  interval,  and  the  survival  status  for  a  particular
observation (or outcome variable) associated with the survival variable.vi
The basic data expression for a household sample of size n consisted of the triple (77,  Sj,
Z#t)), j=  1, ... , n  where T was the time that thejth  household spent in the panel for the survey,
dj was the  poverty-event indicator (either to  enter  or exit the poverty  zone, depending on  the
context of the analysis -- di = I if the event had occurred and 3j = 0 otherwise, including a right-
censored observation), and Zj(t) = (4Z(t), ...,  /jp(t))'  was the vector of covariates (potential risk
factors) for the jth  household at time t, which may have affected the survival distribution of X,
which  represented the poverty  pattern over time. Leaving  aside  for  the time  being a  detailed
discussion of the covariates (which will be done later as part of the further  specification of the
model in the results section), the actual form of the covariates that were used here wasZj(t) = Zj =
(Zj,  ..., 4jp)'.  This means that the time-dependent covariates were excluded as the analysis was
aimed at predicting risk factors for a household's poverty status over time in terms of the time-
invariant attributes of the household or the household's situation.
Formally, in the case of outflows from poverty, the survival function was defined as the
probability of a household "surviving" (remaining) in the poverty zone beyond time t:  S(t) = Pr
(T > t) = Ytj>t p(tj), where T was the time until the household exited poverty (theduration of stay
in poverty or the duration of occupancy) and was assumed to be a non-negative, discrete random
variable from a homogenous population, and p(t,) = Pr(T= tj), was the probability mass function,
estimated as the probability per unit time (per one month) of a household exiting the poverty zone
within the interval t, where t = 1,...,4.  For the discrete random variable, such as the four time
intervals used here, which were each 12 months long, S(t) was the probability of the household
being  in the poverty zone at the end of the interval. If T was treated  as a continuous random
variable, the survival function was a complement of the cumulative distribution function:S(t) = 1
- F(t), where F(t) = Pr(T < t). 33
S°(t)  and  Sr(t)  denoted  the  values  of  the  survival  function  when  benefit-derived
consumption  was  included  and  when  household  consumption  was  reduced  by  not  counting
benefits  in the  definition of the  household welfare  status respectively.  In the case  of outflows
from the poverty zone, the inequality S°(t) < S'(t) meant that a given type of benefit had the effect
of helping households to move out of poverty. Analogously in the case of inflows into the poverty
zone, S°(t) > Sr(t) meant that a transfer had the effect of preventing households from falling into
the poverty zone.
Of  particular  interest here are,  however, the chances  of a poor household  exiting the
poverty zone in the next instant. This was represented by the hazard function, h(t), that was more
informative than the survival function about the underlying mechanism of exiting poverty.
The hazard rate is defined as the conditional probability of a household exiting poverty
within the time interval (of length  t after t) given that it occupied the state of poverty for a time t
was defined as:
h(t) = lim  Pr(t:<  T < t + At l T >_  t) .
t-  0  At
33 See  Klein and Moeschberger  (1997)  and Lancaster  (1990)  for details.
16In other word, it is the instantaneous rate of rising out of poverty per unit time period at
t.3
When the duration of being in poverty, T, is treated as a discrete random variable (as in
this study), the value of the discrete-time hazard at the time point tj can be given by
h(tj) = Pr(exit at tj I survival to tj)
= Pr(T = tj I T > tj) = p(tj) / S(tj  1); j = 1,2, ... M
where S(to) = 1, and  p(tj) was the discrete probability mass function at tj, which was the
estimated probability per unit time of exiting poverty in the interval; and M was the number of
isolated times (months) in which the exit could occur.
Analogously to the case of survival function, the hazard rates calculated with and without
the benefits were compared in order to assess the impact of a given type of transfer program. For
those in poverty, the inequality h0(tj) > hr (tj) would mean that the benefits helped them to exit
poverty,  while for the non-poor ho(tj) < hr (tj) would mean that the benefits were affecting their
risk of falling into poverty helping them to avoid falling into poverty?
Since vulnerable  households had  consistently been  shown to  be more  likely to  suffer
from  chronic  poverty  and  to  have  less  of  a  chance  of rising  out of  it  than  non-vulnerable
households, both the survival functions and the hazard rates were, for most cases, calculated for
these  two  strata  (for  vulnerable  and  non-vulnerable  households).  This  was  also  a  way  of
''neutralizing"  the  possible  effect  of the  behavioral  response  (as  discussed  in  the  previous
section).  So, in fact, what was compared were the values S,0(t) with Svr(t)  and h,(tj) with  hv' (tj),
where v stood for the strata -- in the case of a household's vulnerability status, v = 1, 2, but other
strata were also occasionally used in this analysis, such as groups distinguished by their level of
welfare dependency.
A  summary  version of the two  measures  -- the  cumulative  survival  function  and the
cumulative  hazard  function  --  are useful  for  making  a  graphic  representation  of the  risk  to
households of remaining in prolonged poverty or their chances of exiting poverty respectively.
The variable representing the proportion of households that "survived"  in poverty for a particular
length of time was estimated as a product of the probabilities of survival up to and including the
current interval. The cumulative hazard function (rate), which is more often used, was given as a
sum of the h(tj), that is, H(t) = ltjKt h(tj).
Determinants  of Poverty  and  the Dynamics  of  Social  Transfers.  Having  assessed the
overall impact of the safety net and its particular components on the poverty status of households
over time, the next  stage of the analysis aimed  to  identify the factors that  are responsible for
differences in the poverty status over time among different groups of households. These factors
were sought from among policy-relevant  socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, while
controlling for households' welfare dependency levels. The issue at the second stage, therefore,
was to model the conditional hazard rate as a function of those characteristics that were included
as covariates in the appropriate model. The aim of this was to predict risk factors for households
falling into and rising  out of poverty.  The model that  was chosen to  achieve this  aim  was a
multiplicative hazard model (of the family of Cox regression models) 5
34 Alternatively,  h(t) At can be interpreted  as the "approximate"  probability  of a household  rising out of
poverty  in the next instant,  conditional  on the household  still  being poor at t.
35  Calculations  were made using Coxreg procedures in SPSS. An extension of the linear regression
approach  (as in the previous  section  where the number  of years in poverty  was the dependent  variable)  but
with the natural logarithm  of the survival time as the dependent  variable could be used instead of the
17Both the  cumulative  survival function  and  the  hazard rate were  estimated  within the
model relating the vector of covariates to poverty survival. The hazard rate was of most use in
this case because the main aim was to assess how the chances of a household exiting poverty or
the risk of it falling  into poverty were influenced by household characteristics (in other words,
which of these characteristics were the most significant risk factors). The hazard rate was defined
as a product of the baseline hazard rate and the Cox function of the covariates as follows:
k h(t I Z) = ho  (t) exp(X  =1  Ij  Zj)
where ho(t) was the baseline hazard function and Z was a vector of covariates.36
Because these household characteristics were included, the model not only yielded more
precious hazard rates than those yielded by the Life Tables procedures but also made it possible
to test hypotheses  about relationships between the  household's  characteristics  and its survival
parameters (that is, the chances of it exiting poverty or the risk of it falling into poverty)3 7 For
instance,  although  both  the  educational  achievement  of  the  head  and  the  type  of  family
significantly affected the number of years that the household spent in the poverty zone, they may
have  had  different  effects  on  the  household's  entry  into and  exit  poverty,  especially  when
analyzed in combination with a given type of benefits.
Given the significantly lower return to education among poor households as opposed to
the average in the sample (as discussed in Okrasa ,1994), it would be reasonable to expect that
education  would affect  a household's ability to avoid falling  into poverty  more than  it would
affect  its chances  of exiting  the poverty  zone. In addition,  this  effect  may  be different  when
education was analyzed in combination with unemployment benefits than with family benefits. 38
Alternatively, the type  of family variable may be more important for explaining  a household's
ability to exit poverty than their ability to avoid it, which may be a stronger effect in the case of
family benefits than unemployment compensation.
The substantive aspects of the model, as well as the time-related status of the particular
regressors - constituting  a time-invariant  covariate vectoe"i  - will be discussed in Part V, after
this section has examined how changes in social benefits affect poverty survival parameters.
In order to assess how social benefits interact with the household-level factors, the hazard
rates (for exiting poverty), which were calculated under the full consumption-based definition of
the poverty status over time, h°(t I Z), were compared with those calculated for household welfare
without family benefits being counted, without unemployment compensation being counted, and
with neither of them being counted -- h'(t  i Z) with r referring to one of these three  situations
(with reduced consumption).  It was assumed that h°(t I Z) > hr  (t IZ)  and, therefore, A (h) = h (t I
Z) - h' (t I Z) was used as a measure of the impact of social benefits on the household's  poverty
status over time. Strictly  similar reasoning was applied to the  case of inflows  into the poverty
multiplicative  hazard model  but only under a specific  assumption  about the error distribution  -- see Klein
and Moeschberger  (1997)  for details.
36  When the cumulative  survival function  is the dependent  variable,  the estimated  model is:  S(t I Z)
[So(t)] e(BIZ,  + - +BkZk). where  So(t)  is the baseline  survival  function  that depends  only  on time.
37 Since  the hazard  rate is in this case not a probability  but the rate of the occurrence  of the "end event" per
unit of time, it does  not need to be less  than 1.
3  Although  unemployment  benefits  are flat rate  payments,  such expectations  (although  treated here as only
an example rather than a  substantive  hypothesis)  may be supported by a  closer connection between
education  and employment  status  than is the case with  family  benefits.
18zone but, of course, with reversed signs of the inequality between the survival quantities for the
"with" and "without" benefits situations.
Also, as in the previous case, the household's vulnerability status, which has been shown
to  have  significant  influence  on  poverty  status over  time,  was  used  as  the  major  stratum.
Consequently, the mode] as actually estimated was slightly different, namely:
h4(t I  Z) = ho,v(t  I  Z) e(Bz  Zk)
where subscript v referred to the hazard function for the vth stratum (v = 1, 2 in the case
of vulnerability).
Another important feature of the model used here was that it was the proportional hazard
model.  In other words, the baseline hazard was shifted by a constant factor that represented the
impact of the covariates. Therefore, the ratio of the hazard rates of two households with different
degrees of vulnerability was assumed to be a constant for all time points3 9 The assumption that
the  baseline  hazard  functions  were  proportional  was tested  using  the  log-minus-log  (LML)
survival plot (for demonstrating that the lines for both strata were parallel. 40
The Duration of Poverty Spells
Before analyzing how much  social benefit each household received,  it was decided to
explore further the patterns of social transfer incidence in relation to the survival parameters. First
of all, how was the degree of welfare dependency that households experienced associated with
the average length of a poverty spell? (This question is essentially a continuation of the questions
discussed in Part  III.) In addition,  what role did households'  accumulated  asset holdings  and
borrowed funds play in lifting or keeping them out of poverty?
Welfare Dependency and Poverty Duration. Generally, the social transfer incidence and
the relative size of benefits in household welfare can be expected to be significantly associated
with  a  household's  poverty  status  over  time  but  to  demonstrate  opposite  patterns  of  the
association to each other. The reason is that, all other things being equal, low-income households
with a large share of benefit-derived consumption in their total consumption should increase their
ability to cope with risk by more than other poor households as reflected by spending less time in
poverty or having a greater chance of rising out of it.
Comparing the duration  of poverty spells among households with a given level of the
welfare dependency can be done on the basis either of the number of programs  from which the
household benefited or of the number of years that it had benefited from the program(s). When
the first  criterion was used,  a household was considered to  be highly welfare-dependent  if  it
received support from each of the following three major types of programs during at least one out
of the  four years  in question:  family  benefits  (including  both  child-related  and  other  family
allowances); unemployment  compensation; and local benefits. For a household to be classified
has  having  low  dependency,  it must  have  received  benefits  from  only  one  program,  while
39  Despite  some restrictions  associated  with these assumptions,  they have computational  advantages  and
provide  simple tools for checking  whether  the distinction  between  two or more groups is associated  with
the respective  chances  or risks in a similar  way (in the form of the requirement  that their cumulative  hazard
rates  should  not cross).  Otherwise,  they should  be treated  within  separate  models.
40  Although  this is discussed  in the results section (below), it can be said in advance that the model
stratified  by vulnerability  status meets  the condition  of the proportional  hazard model. It holds both in a
general  case as well as when  the two groups  (vulnerable  and non-vulnerable  households)  are disaggregated
by some important  characteristics,  such as family  type or the welfare  dependency  level.
19medium dependency meant that  it had  received benefits from any  two of the three  programs.
When the second criterion was used, welfare dependency was indicated by the number of years
during which the household had participated in a given program, ranging from zero to four years
(the highest) for each of the three programs.
Using the first indicator of the welfare  dependency, the median poverty  spell duration
was estimated by survival analysis (using Life Table techniques). The results of this estimation
are  presented  in  Table  B-la.  in  Appendix  B.  The  table  contains  the  results  for:  (i)  those
households that became poor during the period being studied and (ii) those that were already poor
at  the beginning of the period being studied ('poverty  spell  left censored').  As expected, the
social transfer  incidence and the poverty  spell duration coincided with each other - they  both
occur to a higher degree among the poor than among the non-poor. The more welfare-dependent
households (in other words, those that received benefits from all of the social programs) stayed in
the poverty zone, on average, longer than the other households. However, the differences  were
modest, especially among those who became poor during the studied period - here the difference
was only up to three months. The differences were much bigger between non-recipients  (who
received no benefits from any program) and recipient households among those households that
were already poor at the beginning of the period (left censored).
Also, the effect of the welfare dependency level was somewhat more discernible among
those who were poor from the start of the period in urban areas than those in the same situation in
rural areas. This indicates that the length of poverty spell was less responsive to transfer incidence
in rural than  in urban households.  It may  be noted that, among  the one-fifth  of the  sampled
households (in the panel) who did not report any benefits during the four years, the fraction of
those  who  experienced some  form  of poverty  was astonishingly  high  --  30  percent'4 1 They
constitute  16 percent of ever poor during the period under study (totaled at  1,906 households).
Taking this  fraction as an estimate  of the analogous  fraction in the  population  (the poor not
receiving any social benefits) it would produce a substantial number of about 700,000 households
(or about 2,2 million of individuals) of not covered by any form of social assistance.
The second  indicator of household welfare  dependency -- the  number of years during
which the household had received benefits -- showed a similar tendency as demonstrated by the
results in Table B-lb  in Appendix B.  When attention was limited to the poverty spells that began
during the period being studied, the median time in the poverty zone tended to be higher among
those households (both urban and rural) that received family benefits for a long period. However,
the pattern of unemployment benefits was mixed. 42
The survival function and the hazard rate  (not shown in Table  B-lb,  but are  available
from the author) behaved accordingly, in that recipient households were found to be more likely
to remain in prolonged poverty. They also had less chance (a lower hazard rate) of rising out of
poverty, and the difference increased with the duration of the poverty spell. The opposite pattern
was observed  in terms  of the  chance of avoiding  poverty. Those  households that  were  more
41  From among 1013  households  (out of 4,919) who reported  receiving  no income from social transfers
other  than pensions  during 1993-96,  there were 305  suffering  some form of poverty  (out of 1,906  ever poor
during  that period);  these 30.1 percent  of the poor-without-benefits  include 14  percent  of poor for one-year,
9 percent  poor for two years,  4 percent  poor for three years, and  2.7 percent permanently  poor (four-years).
42 Urban  households  receiving  unemployment  benefits  for more  than two  years spent a declining  number  of
months in poverty, while rural households  showed  the same trend after three years. In other words, the
long-term  presence  of a registered  unemployed  person in the household  did not necessarily  mean that it was
poorer than other households, including those with no  unemployed member. This may  reflect the
complicated  nature  of the relationship  between  a household's  welfare and the unemployment  status of its
members (for example,  an unemployment  turnover among the members of the better-off multi-eamer
households  - this it was discussed  earlier).
20dependent on social benefits had a lower probability of surviving outside the poverty zone than
others. At the same time, they faced a much higher risk of falling into the poverty zone.
The findings regarding the duration of households'  poverty spells and the risks of them
becoming  poor or rising  out of poverty  can be  summarized as  follows:  the tendency  for  a
household to remain in the poverty zone for a longer period of time coincided with  it having  a
higher  welfare  dependency  (as  defined  either  as the  number  of programs  from  which  the
household benefited or of the number of years  during which it had benefited from them). More
dependent households also had less of chance of exiting poverty and a bigger risk of falling into
poverty.
This  result  seems to  support the  contention that  the  distribution  of  social  benefits  in
Poland generally accords with the distribution of households' heeds relative to their welfare status
over time. However, to find out precisely how much a household depends on social transfers, it is
necessary to look beyond incidence to the amount of benefits that the household receives. This
will be discussed later in this section, after an examination of the role that non-income sources of
household welfare played in helping  households to avoid poverty, escape poverty, and limit the
duration of their poverty spells.
Non-income Sources of Welfare.  Consumption-based measures of household welfare do
not necessarily exhaust, nor are they limited to, the household's disposable income. It was shown
in the previous section that households' accumulated asset holdings and borrowed funds may play
an  important  role  in  terms  of their  poverty  status over  time.  Thus,  some  important  policy
questions  arise  about  how  far  does  relying  on  savings  or  borrowed  money  strengthens  a
household's ability to manage its long-term poverty problem?  In particular, do asset holdings and
borrowed funds play  a  bigger role  in helping  a household to  maintain  its consumption  level
during a poverty spell or during the time when  it is not poor?  In other words,  are they more
important for helping the poor to rise out of poverty or for preventing vulnerable households from
falling into poverty?
According to the results of survival analysis (which are only summarized here), the use of
these assets or borrowed funds was associated both with a decrease in the risk of remaining in
poverty and with an increased chance of rising out of it. 43 The median time spent in poverty was
slightly more than 23 months for households without non-income sources of welfare, while it was
21 months among recipients of all three kinds of sources (savings, formal and informal credits or
loans).
However, the overall effect of these non-income sources of welfare in helping households
to rise out of poverty was rather modest, and was much smaller than the effect of social benefits
incidence. This accords with the observation that was made earlier that the poor, even those who
report using such non-income  sources, have hardly any assets and have little access to  formal
credit.
Nevertheless, in contrast to their limited role in promoting the poor from poverty, asset
holdings  and  borrowing  contributed  significantly  to  a  household's  ability  to  avoid  poverty.
However, there was, again, a  difference between  informal credit and the other sources. Money
borrowed from private sources showed a similar pattern as social transfers, which was that the
borrowers faced a higher risk of falling into poverty than other households. The supposition that
low-income households turn to private, informal loans as their last hope for avoiding poverty is
43 The effect  of alternative  sources  of maintenance  on households'  poverty  status  was not analyzed,  mostly
because they are, in general, not considered  to be a part of income and cannot be incorporated  into the
analysis  by the consumption  adjustment  factor  defined  previously.
21supported also by the fact that borrowers were over-represented among the poorest households,
with  35 percent  of the  permanently  poor borrowing  from  private  sources  compared  with  24
percent among the richest (those that had never been poor).
While  social  benefits  were  more  effective  in helping  people  to  rise  out  of  poverty,
financial assets were a  more effective tool than  social benefits  in preventing  households  from
falling into long-term poverty. In other words, households that had accumulated asset holdings or
that  had  borrowed money  had  much  bigger  chance of  remaining  out  of poverty  than  those
households that had no access to such sources. They were also less likely to remain in prolonged
poverty (but this effect was weaker).
The Dynamics of Poverty and Social Benefits
This subsection examines the effect of the amount of benefits received by the household
on the duration of time that it spent in poverty (the context of promotion) and on the duration of
time that it managed to survive outside the poverty zone (the context of prevention).
Benefits and the chance of exitingpoverty.  The overall impact of social benefits on long-
term  poverty,  in  terms  of reduction  of the  length  of  poverty  spell,  was  significant  but  not
dramatically big (partly, due to using median for describing them). This impact is illustrated by
the median time of remaining in the poverty zone as seen in Table  B-2 in Appendix B. When
benefit-derived consumption was not taken into account, the median length of the poverty spells
increased by about four months -- from one year and ten months to two years and two months
(roughly  by  about one-fifth).  This means that a  change of  1 percent  in household disposable
income due  to  social  benefits  (given that  they  account  on  average  for  about  10 percent  of
household  income)  would  induce a  nearly  2  percent  change  in  the  average  time  spent  by
households  in the  poverty zone. In other words,  it may be noted that,  in order to  reduce the
average duration of poverty in the population to up to one year (or by 45 percent), social benefits
would  have  to  be  increased (in  terms  of their  share  of household  income  and  assuming  no
changes had been made in the way they are distributed) by about 13 percent.
These  proportions  differ  considerably  between  family  benefits  and  unemployment
benefits. Taking recipient households alone (meaning a household that received a given type of
benefits during  at least one of the four years being studied), it was estimated that a  1 percent
change in shares of family benefits (which accounted for about 5 percent of household income)
would yield a change of slightly more than 2 percent in the average duration of poverty. In the
case of unemployment benefits (which accounted for about I I percent of the income of recipient
households),  a  1 percent change  would yield  a  3 percent  change  in the  average duration  of
poverty.
These findings firmly  demonstrate that the  long-term poverty effects of social benefits
depend  both on their level and on  the way in which they  are distributed.  At  a given  level of
benefits,  the  larger  the  fraction of  households that  received a  particular type  of  benefit, the
smaller the difference between the survival quantities calculated for the recipient households and
for  all  of the  sampled  households.  These  calculations  are  presented  in  the  columns  labeled
"recipient"  and  "all"  in  Table  B-2  in Appendix  B. They  made  it possible  to  compare  in  a
preliminary  way  the  importance of  benefit-derived  consumption  for  poverty  duration.  The
difference  between  the  two  columns was  especially  apparent  when  all  social  benefits  were
compared with unemployment benefits. All benefits were received by 80 percent of households44
while  the  cumulative  fraction  of  those  that  reported  receiving  income  from  unemployment
44  The recipient  fraction  among  urban  households  was higher  (82 percent)  than among  rural  households  (75
percent).
22benefits during at least one of the four years was about 25 percent (though in none of the four
years did the fraction exceed 10 percent).
The place of the residence did not significantly affect the median length of poverty spells
as far as aggregated benefits were concerned (with the rural poor appearing to be only slightly
less  affected  than  the  urban  poor).
4 5 However,  location  had  a  stronger  impact  when
unemployment benefits and family allowances were treated separately, though only in the case of
recipient households. If the share of unemployment benefits in household income were increased
by  I percent, this would reduce the average length of poverty for the urban poor by 3.3 percent
and for the rural poor by  1.8 percent. Alternatively, according to Table B-2 in Appendix B, if
unemployment benefits were withdrawn, this would increase the length of poverty by half a year
for urban households and by  about 4.5 months for rural households. The analogous figures for
family  allowances  were more  differentiated between the  poor in  urban and  rural  areas -- 3.8
percent and 1.9 percent respectively. However, family allowances accounted for a slightly higher
proportion of the income of rural households (6.8 percent) than of urban households (5.5 percent),
while the  shares of unemployment  benefits  in the  income of urban  and rural  recipients  were
practically identical.
In  contrast,  a  household's  vulnerability  status  made  a  big  difference,  regardless  of
whether or not benefit-derived consumption  was taken  into account.  In both  cases, vulnerable
households were likely to stay longer in the poverty zone (for nearly half a year) than the others.
Vulnerability  status  appears  to  be  more  important  with  respect  to  family  benefits  than  to
unemployment benefits. Among recipients of unemployment compensation, the length of poverty
spells estimated  for  vulnerable  and  non-vulnerable  households  was only  about two  months,
whereas the difference between vulnerable and non-vulnerable households in the whole sample
was about half a year. This accords with the observation that withdrawing these benefits would
prolong the length of a household's poverty spell by a larger factor (about one-third) than if it was
due to the household's  vulnerability status alone (about one-quarter). One reason for this may lie
in the fact that  recipients  of unemployment  benefits were  generally more  vulnerable than  the
others (included in the "all"  column)Y4- 6 Another reason may be associated with the fact (which
was  discussed  above)  that  the  average  length  of  time  during  which  a  household  received
unemployment  benefits was much shorter than the average length of time for receiving  family
benefits.""
The degree to  which the  poverty survival parameters differed  between vulnerable and
non-vulnerable households can be interpreted as an indication of the sensitivity of a program to
the  long-term economic  outlook  of  the  poor  household.  Vulnerable  households  may  have  a
different intensity of either  moving out of poverty or falling  into poverty  (albeit the difference
was not big enough to violate  the assumption  of the employed proportional  hazard model, as
discussed below).  The relative  importance of a household's  vulnerability status in this context
was examined by testing differences between the mean social benefits received by vulnerable and
non-vulnerable households. [Detailed information is available from the author.]
According to the F-test, vulnerable  households received a slightly  higher level of both
family  allowances  and  unemployment  benefits  than  non-vulnerable  households  (though  the
differences  are barely significant at the  level of 0.05) during each year except  1993 (in which
there  was  no  significant  difference).  The  two  groups  received  "local"  benefits  and  other
45  However, in rural areas, the average level of total social benefits per capita was lower by about 20
percent during  the four-year  period, except in 1996  when it was almost  equal to that in urban areas. The
rural-urban  differences  in the average  level of local  benefits  and unemployment  compensation  were bigger.
46  While,  recipients  of unemployment  benefits  are somewhat  more vulnerable  (38 percent)  than recipients
of family  benefits  (34 percent),  the fraction  of vulnerable  households  that receive  unemployment  benefits  is
small  (31 percent)  compared  to vulnerable  recipients  of family  benefits  (70 percent).
23allowances  at  practically  the  same  level.  However,  no  intelligible  pattern  emerged  from
comparing  the  levels  of  benefits  (either  aggregated  or  separate)  received  by  households
categorized by  their poverty status, regardless  of whether or not the  household's  vulnerability
status was taken into account.'x
To translate these results into an appraisal of the performance of the safety net, it may be
concluded that, as far as average amounts of benefits are concerned, neither  vulnerability nor
poverty status over time is crucially important for the way in which social benefits are distributed
among recipient households. In other words, the benefits might be received at similar  levels by
different categories of households - occasionally and chronically poor as well as non-poor - and
can  be  used for  different  purposes,  ranging  from  rising out  of poverty  to  avoiding  poverty.
Nevertheless, these benefits could still have had a substantial distributional impact with respect to
either of these aims if the recipients of the benefit were concentrated around the poverty line in
each of the four consecutive years. This is why it seemed appropriate to suspend judgment about
the safety net's  performance until it has been tested for its impact on households'  transitions in
and out of poverty.
Changes in a household's  risk of remaining in poverty and in its chances of rising out of
it  (that  is, in  the  survival  function  and  the  hazard rate)  provide  more  accurate  and  reliable
information  about how  benefits  affect  poverty status over time than  can be gleaned from the
median  length of poverty  spells. These data are  presented in Table  B-4  in Appendix B. The
changes clearly showed the same trend as the length of time in poverty, as discussed above, and
they were sizeable.
The results in the columns labeled "survival function" reflect the cumulative proportions
of households that "survived"  at the end of a given year  in poverty. These results clearly  show
that the risk of a household remaining in poverty beyond that time period (especially after having
been poor for one year already) would be significantly larger if benefit-derived consumption was
not included in the calculation of household welfare. Also, the difference between the baseline
estimates  with  total  consumption  and  those  without  a  given  type  of  benefits  was  roughly
proportional to the share of that benefit in the disposable income of the recipient households. This
explains  the  finding  that  unemployment  benefits  had  a  generally  greater  impact  than  family
benefits. 47
At the same time, the probability of a household rising out of poverty within a given 12-
month period, as expressed by the hazard rate, was substantially smaller when  social benefits
were  not  counted.  For  instance,  the  chance  of  a  household  exiting  poverty  after  one  year
decreased  (from  full  consumption-based  household  welfare)  by  a  factor  of  two  when
unemployment  compensation was not  counted  and  by a  factor of one  and  half  when  family
benefits were not counted.x [Detail information is available from the author.]
If it is assumed that social policymakers are likely to be interested in the relative impact
of the  particular components  of  the  existing  safety net, then  two  questions  arise.  First,  how
effective is a given type  of program in helping the poor to rise out of poverty  after a defined
period of time? Second, how sensitive is the program to differences in the long-term economic
outlook of households as indicated by their vulnerability status?
The  hazard  rate  appears  to  be  the  most  appropriate  measure  for  addressing  these
questions as depicted  in  Figure  3. The curves  depict  the poverty  exit  rates  over  time  in the
baseline case and in the case of the major types of social benefits (all benefits, family benefits, or
47  In the further analysis, the aggregate  "family allowances"  was meant to include the residual "other"
family  benefits  (which  constitute  about 10  to 15  percent  of this aggregate).
24unemployment  compensation)  with  households  stratified  by  their  vulnerability  status.  The
distance from the baseline estimates  of the hazard rate calculated for each of these three cases
represents their impact on a poor household's chances of rising out of poverty after being poor for
a given 12-month period.
At first glance, the changes in the shapes of the hazard functions instantly brought to light
the profound differences in poverty exit rates over time between the "with" and "without" benefit
situations. The differences became even more apparent when vulnerability status was included.
The shape of the graph changed from a irregular hump-shaped concave downwards curve in the
baseline case to a concave upwards curve when benefit-derived consumption was not counted.
This indicates that social transfers caused a dramatic increase in vulnerable households' chances
of rising out of poverty.
Figure  3:  Poverty  Exit  --  Hazard  Rate  under  Alternative  Definitions  of  Household
Consumption (calculated both with and without benefit-derived consumption)
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For instance, when benefit-derived consumption was not counted, vulnerable households
had only half the chance of rising out of poverty after one year than in the baseline case, while the
25chance for non-vulnerable  households was reduced by only about one-third compared with the
baseline  case.  This  means  that,  when  all  benefits  were  withdrawn,  a  poor  and  vulnerable
household  had  about the  same exit  rate after  completing  its  first  year  in poverty  as a  non-
vulnerable household would have had if it had stayed in poverty for another year. In practice, this
is consistent with the difference between occasional and chronic poverty expressed in terms of the
changes in risk that may be attributed to social benefits. 4
The chances of rising out of poverty would be reduced at each point in time if benefit-
derived consumption was not counted,  but those  in prolonged  poverty would  be in particular
jeopardy because the differences between vulnerable and non-vulnerable households grew as the
amount of time  in poverty  increased. For example, for non-vulnerable households  in their 20"'
month  of poverty, the  increase  in the exit  rate  due  to benefits  ranged  from 20  to  above 40
percentage points for family benefits  and unemployment  benefits respectively. The chances of
vulnerable  households rising out of poverty changed even more than  those of non-vulnerable
households when benefit-derived consumption was not counted (being almost half of the chances
in the baseline  situation). Family benefits had only a slightly larger impact than unemployment
benefits.
One reason for the difference in the impact of unemployment and family benefits relates
to their different criteria regarding eligibility  and duration. Another reason relates the fact that
unemployment benefits were more concentrated and paid at a generally higher level than family
benefits to the recipient households. From  1993 onwards, the payments were, on average, higher
to  non-vulnerable than  to  vulnerable  households. The opposite  was true for  all  households  -
family  benefits  were  generally  higher  than  unemployment  benefits,  which  were  given  at  a
somewhat higher level to the vulnerable.
In  contrast  to  the  case  of family  benefits,  it cannot be  assumed  that  the  number  of
recipients  of unemployment  benefits and the  number of unemployed (whether or not they  are
registered as unemployed) are the same. People may cease to receive the benefits (even though
they continue to be unemployed) when their spell of unemployment has exceeded the maximum
duration allowed.  In fact, about one-third of the sampled households who reported  having an
unemployed member did not receive unemployment benefits in each of the four years in the study
(and the figures were the same in both urban and rural areas).X
This corresponds  with  the  findings of  Cazes and  Scarpetta  (1998)  that  many  people
without unemployment benefits leave the unemployment register to the inactive status rather than
to employment. Leaving aside the possibility that they may be in "hidden"  employment  in the
informal sector (despite that  its size was shrinking during  1993-96 -- Johnson,  Kaufmann and
Shleifer, 1997; Jakobiak and Jeznach  1999 49)  this also means that this hypothetical situation of
being  "without"  unemployment  benefits  may  actually  be  experienced  by  many  recipient
48  If the baseline  model  was estimated  only for recipient  households,  the differences  between  hazard rates
for  the "with" and  "without" benefits cases would be  only slightly changed, depending on  how
concentrated  or scattered  "all" benefits  are among  the recipients  of a particular  program.  Since the results
only for recipients  were not significantly  different  from the presented  above,  they are not included  in this
part of the discussion.
49  The informal  sector in Poland  increased  at the beginning  of the transition  accounting  for about one-forth
of the economy  (24 percent  in 199, same level as in Russia,  but smaller  than in Hungary  with 33 percent)
but has systematically  been declining  since  then to 12.6  percent  in 1995  (compared  to 42 percent  in Russia
and 29 percent in Hungary  -- see Johnson,  Kaufmann,  and Shleifer  (1997); according  to GUS's estimates
(Jakobiak  and Jeznach, 1999), the rate of decline  was somewhat  lower with indication  on  unregistered
employment  as responsible  for about one-third of the total value of the 'shadow  economy' (retail trade
accounted for nearly half of the GNP produced in the 'shadow economy',47 percent, followed by
construction,  17  percent).
26households whose unemployed members have ceased to receive benefits  but are still without a
job.  (This may  also  be  a  reason why  the  distinction  between vulnerable  and  non-vulnerable
households was  less  important  in the  case  of  unemployment  benefits  than  in that  of  family
benefits).
In general, social benefits had a significant impact on outflows from poverty by reducing
the  average length of time  that households spent  in the poverty zone  and by  increasing their
chances  of  exiting  the  poverty  zone.  These  effects  were  slightly  bigger  in  the  case  of
unemployment benefits than in the case of family benefits. The impact was rather sensitive to the
household's  long-term economic outlook as the benefits operate to the advantage of vulnerable
households  more  than  the  others  (especially  in connection with  family  benefits,  because the
difference was somewhat lower in the case of unemployment benefits).
Benefits and the Chance of Avoiding Poverty.  The next  important issue was to find out
how effective the social safety net was in preventing households from falling into poverty. This
meant  including the household's vulnerability status, which, in a static type of poverty analysis,
typically  is conceived as a configuration of certain characteristics that make a household more
likely than other households to fall into poverty5 0 However, the focus of this analysis was on
those  households that were  non-poor at the  beginning  of the period  being studied  and  either
became poor during that period or continued to  be non-poor.'  In consequence, evaluating the
performance  of the  social safety  net  involved assessing  its effectiveness  not  only  in helping
households of the first group to postpone falling into poverty but also in helping households of
the second group to avoid it successfully. 51 The first aspect of avoiding poverty (surviving outside
the poverty zone) was examined by comparing households'  survival functions, while the hazard
rate was used for analyzing the transition into poverty during the studied period.
In general, social benefits were found to have a preventive impact in helping households
to remain out of poverty, according to the values of the survival functions presented in Table B-5
in  Appendix  B.  The benefits  contributed  significantly  to  an  increase  in the  probability  of
remaining out of poverty, and by the same token, to the  length of time  a household remained
outside the poverty zone. This was true for all households in the sample and specifically for the
benefit recipient households. The emerging pattern was consistent across different time periods
and types of social programs. At each point in time, the benefit-derived consumption contributed
to the probability that a household would survive outside the poverty zone.
However, it should be borne in mind that the survival parameters here have an opposite
meaning  to  the  meaning  that  they  had  in  the  discussion  of the  role  of  benefits  in  helping
households to rise out of poverty. In this case, the survival function represents the household's
chances of avoiding poverty, and the hazard represents the risk of it falling into poverty. Thus, the
overall contribution  of social benefits to  preventing households  from falling  into poverty  was
smaller than their contribution to helping the poor to avoid staying in the poverty zone for a long
period of time.x'
11 Unemployment benefits had a greater effect in terms of helping households to
stay  out of poverty  than  family  benefits.  They were also  more  responsive  to  changes  in the
household's welfare position over time, which can be seen by the fact that they had a much bigger
impact on vulnerable households than on non-vulnerable households.
50 It is a worthwhile  to remember  that not all vulnerable  households  fell into the poverty zone during  the
four-year  study  period - 45 percent of them managed  to avoid doing so, and they constitute  nearly  one-
quarter  (23 percent)  of the group  that  had never been  poor.
51  Since  remaining  outside  the poverty  zone is a left-censored  phenomenon  and no "beginning"  of the time-
to-event was observed,  the median time of being non-poor  cannot be precisely  calculated  and so is not
presented  here.
27Focusing on the role of social benefits in aiding those households that fell into poverty,
the risk that they would do so - represented by the hazard rate in Figure 4- varied greatly among
the major types of social benefits. This was even more so than in the case of those that survived
outside  the  poverty  zone,  especially  when  the  households'  vulnerability  was  taken  into
consideration.
Figure  4: Avoiding  Poverty  -- Hazard Rate  under Alternative  Definitions  of Household
Consumption by Vulnerability Status
Hazard  Function:  total  consumption  Hazard  Function:  w/t  social  benefits
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First of all, the irregular hump-shaped curves are all concave downward, in contrast to the
shape of the curves in Figure 3, which described households'  chances of rising out of poverty.
The conditional probability of falling into poverty rises to  a peak before starting to  fall.  The
hazard to poverty grows rapidly during the first year (when the curves reach their vertices)  and
drops afterwvards  but at a diminishing rate, becoming a constant hazard after about two years.5
52Hazard  functions  with  this shape are often  found in some  models of the process  of leaving employment
(Lancaster,  1990).
28The risk  grows  at  much  higher rate  among vulnerable  households  than  among  non-
vulnerable households. One reason for this is that there are two destination states included here --
one is the poverty zone and other is the outside-poverty zone (in which some households remain
permanently).  Another  reason  reflects  the  fact  that  vulnerable  households  had  a  greater
propensity to fall into poverty than others, but their risk (conditional probability) of falling  into
poverty  declined after one year, with  a tendency to stabilize with each year  during which  the
household successfully managed to avoid falling into poverty.
Not counting social benefit-derived consumption would result in a notable increase in the
risk of poverty. As expected, the hazard to poverty was generally lower than was the rate at which
households rose  out of  poverty.  However, the  impact  of  benefits was  more  sensitive  to  the
household's  long-term economic outlook as indicated by the consistently greater differences in
the risk between the vulnerable and the non-vulnerable (confirming that  vulnerable households
are much less likely than others never to be poor).  This is conspicuously so in the case of the
impact of unemployment benefits. Withdrawing these benefits would increase the risk of poverty
among the vulnerable households by  a factor  of about three  compared with the  baseline case.
Among non-vulnerable households, the increase would be by a factor of two, reaching about the
same level of risk as vulnerable households in the case of full consumption.
Comparing  the  effects  of  social  benefits  in preventing  households  from  falling  into
poverty  and  in  promoting  them  from  poverty,  they  appeared  to  weight  more  for the  poor,
especially the chronically poor, than for the non-poor households (including those who eventually
became  poor).  However, they  are  somewhat  more responsive  to the  household's  long-term
economic outlook in terms of preventing poverty -- as they help vulnerable households more than
others to avoid falling into poverty -- than in terms of helping to lift households out of poverty
(when the difference between vulnerable  and non-vulnerable becomes, however, less important
and somewhat redundant).
29PART III: THE DETERMINANTS OF POVERTY AND SOCIAL TRANSFER
DYNAMICS
Introduction
How social policy interventions affect poverty in the long term depends both on how the
benefits are allocated (given the fixed amount of social outlay) and on the household's ability to
manage  the  risk  of becoming  chronically  poor.  For  instance,  the  portion  of  total  household
consumption  derived  from  flat-rate  unemployment  benefits  may  vary  substantially  among
families that are  in the same  quintile but that  differ in  size or composition (leaving  aside the
problem of the sensitivity of the results to which equivalence scale  is adopted).  On the other
hand,  even  if  two  households  of  identical  size  and  composition  had  the  same  level  of
consumption funded by benefits, one of them may end up being chronically poor, while the other
may manage to escape falling into poverty. The households that escaped poverty may have done
so because of such unmeasured factors as their members'  entrepreneurial ability or retraining,
factors which are typically  associated with educational achievements or tlhe age of the head of
household.  (Again, this  leaves aside the  problem  of behavioral  response  as captured  in this
analysis in terms of the distinction between vulnerable and non-vulnerable households).
This section makes extensive use of the results presented in the preceding sections. The
initial specification of the model is applicable here too"v As regards the substance of the model,
two important constraints imposed by the model requirements had to be taken into account when
the predictor variables were selected.  These constraints were: (i) that, for any two households in
different categories (such as the vulnerable/non-vulnerable distinction), the ratio of the estimated
hazards over time is a constant and (ii) the covariates are not time-dependent.
A Further Specification of the Model
The initial goal was to compare how the policy-relevant characteristics of households -
the potential risk factors - modified the impact of social benefits on their survival parameters in
terms both of avoiding poverty and of rising out of poverty. Therefore, the same set of predictors
was run through the model in each context (prevention against falling into and promotion from
the poverty zone). Stratifying the sample by household vulnerability status 54 ,v was particularly
meaningful here as it is likely that vulnerable households move out of persistent poverty (three-
year poverty) at a different  intensity (generally lower) than non-vulnerable households because
they have some characteristics that make them recipients of benefits. Given the fact that this study
only covers the cases of poverty exit that occurred during the period under study (four years), it
might be assumed that the proportional hazard model was met (in other words, that the effects of
53 The issue  of the sensitivity  of these results  to the selected  equivalence  scale might be of interest given
that the OECD  scale was used.  Despite  being commonly  praised  for being straightforward  and easy  to use,
this scale is usually considered  to assume economies  of scale that are too small across the family size
distribution  (National  Research Council, 1995). Alternative  approaches  are discussed by Lanjouw and
Ravallion  (1995). Regarding  the possibility  of including  the effect of changes in relative prices between
private  and  public  goods, see Lanjouw,  Milanovic,  and Paternostro  (1998).
54  It was made in all applications,  although  the LML (log-minus-log)  test showed  that the baseline  hazard
function  may not have been consistently  proportional  in both strata  (vulnerable  and non-vulnerable)  in the
case of outflow from three-year and longer-term  poverty when the benefit-derived  consumption  was
excluded. However,  it was proportional  under  the full consumption  measure  of household  welfare.
30the covariates were the same in both groups). '5 Such a reservation is not needed in the case of
entry into the poverty zone, as the intensities remained strictly identical in all applications.
A series of working hypotheses can be offered for guiding the search into how the socio-
demographic  characteristics  and  social  benefits  allocation  scheme  jointly  determine  poverty
survival parameters and, consequently, a household's poverty status over time.
Therefore, those  demographic  and  household endowment variables  (including  human
capital  and  access to  some  financial assets)  that  affect  chronic  poverty  in a  significant  way
(discussed in Okrasa, 1999) were of primary interest in this analysis. These variables were: (i) the
household head's  age, educational  achievement, and marital status; (ii) the  composition of the
household (type of family); (iii) segmentation variables (such as the socioeconomic  group into
which  the  household fits  or the  sector  in  which  the household  head  is employed);  and  (iv)
indicators of the household's access to non-income sources of welfare and of the extent to which
it benefits from transfers.
A detailed typology of households was used because this is relevant to their chances of
experiencing  long-term  poverty  and  because  policy  priorities  typically  take  into account  the
distinction between families with and without children and between small and large families in
terms of the number of children.' 6 This information is often supplemented by the marital status of
the household's head which, therefore, is included in the control variables  in this analysis (with
divorced as a left category). For reasons similar to those that applied in the case of the type  of
family, a set of dummies representing a household's socioeconomic group was included in a set of
the predictor variaBles (with pensioners as an omitted category).
Some of the characteristics mentioned above have also been discussed in the literature as
being associated with unemployment. Not surprisingly, the long-term poverty profiles that were
discussed  earlier  in this  section resemble,  to  a  large  extent,  the  labor  market  segmentation
described in studies of unemployment in Poland (for instance, Kalaska and Witkowski, 1997) and
of duration of unemployment (Cazes and Scarpetta, 1998). In particular, young, poorly educated,
unskilled workers, who face the greatest risk of becoming and remaining unemployed for a long
period of time  have  also  been  identified  in  this  study  as  having  the  greatest  risk  of  being
chronically poor.
On the other hand, the absence in the model of some of the variables that  are typically
present in poverty analysis - especially, of those that showed significance for  chronic poverty
(Okrasa, 1999) - may also need to be explained. For instance, income composition is commonly
perceived  as  a  proxy  of  a  household's  capacity  to  respond  to  economic  change  because  it
represents such unmeasured factors  as skills and entrepreneurship  (see Grootaert, Kanbur,  and
Oh, 1995). However, it is not included in this analysis because it is considered redundant, given
the construction of the dependent variable under alternative definitions of household welfare as
the  share  of  income  from  benefits  was  used  as  an  adjustment  factor  for  benefit-derived
consumption.
Another example of an omitted variable might be the regional  rate of poverty, but this
cannot be treated as time-invariant during the entire period -- for example, in 1993, it varied from
55  This makes it possible both to use the advantages  of the proportional  hazard model (without further
complicating  it by introducing  the time-dependent  variables)  and to use less space in presenting  the results
(without  the necessity  of replicating  them for separately  run  models).
56  If analysts are interested  in controlling  for the fact that different  families receive different  types of
benefits,  an interaction  term - a product  of the type of family  and the type of social  benefits  receipt  - can
be included as a covariate  in the model  with full consumption  (but  this approach  was not tried here).
319.6 percent in the Capital region to 18.4 in the South-East region (World Bank,  1995). However,
geographical  region was included  into the  set of covariates  in a  complementary  model (as  a
pattern variable, instead of the type of family). Owning a house was not included for its vague
poverty effect, as it is standard for poor families and  individuals to own a house  in rural areas
(and these households are over-represented among the chronically poor). Physical assets were not
included directly, on the one hand, because of the endogeneity of selling durables while, on the
other  hand, their  function  as  collateral  for  borrowing  is captured  in an  indirect  way  by  the
incidence of credit and loans transactions, an indicator variable that is included.
The time-invariant status of such regressors which - in contrast with such characteristics
as the head's gender, level of education, or age cohort or the business cycle - may or may not
have been changing over time was ensured by checking them  either at the beginning and at the
end of the period being studied or in each year of the entire period. The first approach was used in
the case of variables being introduced all at once, as illustrated by the six-category typology of
household compositionx`i (with households of unrelated individuals as a left category).
Due to the policy importance of this variable (changes in that capture such life events as
family dissolution or a newborn baby) the analysis was run on those households that were in the
same category both in 1993 and in 1996. As a consequence, about 11 percent of households that
changed from one category to another were dropped. The head's marital status (which, in contrast
to the quasi-ordered type of family, is strictly categorical) exemplifies using dummies with a '1'
for the constant cases. A "female head," the presence of a disabled person in household, and the
head's  sector of employment were approximated as constant by comparing their values in  1993
and 1996 (also with a 'F for the constant cases).
The dichotomous indicators of receipt of private or public transfers, as well as of use of
credits and loans or possession of a savings account, were coded '1' if they occurred in each of the
four years being studied (zero otherwise). 57 Their inclusion in a covariate vector raises a question
about endogeneity. However, these variables were included in order to control for such aspects of
household behavior as participating in a kinship network or having information about and access
to public transfers and to non-income sources (savings or credits and loans). Since no information
about the amount of the respective transfers  or transactions was used, they  did not have to be
considered to be endogenous, especially  in the context of moving out of poverty because  the
indicators reflected  what the situation  was before the household fell  into poverty.8 Also,  the
frequency distributions  of these  indicator variables  by the number of years in poverty did not
differ between the  poor and  non-poor, except in respect of whether they  possessed a  savings
account.""  However, an alternative version of the model, with these variables omitted, produced
very similar estimates of the remaining variables' coefficients.
The only variable that was used in its initial version (as of 1993) was the socioeconomic
group variable, despite the fact that there was some inter-group transition during the period (the
group consisting of those living on welfare was the least stable, followed by the self-employed).
However, this variable represents the "policy-relevant biography" of a household at the time that
it fell into poverty, and, therefore, it had to be included in a set of fixed-time regressors.
57  In the case of inter-household  transfers,  households  reported  either giving  or receiving  them. In the case
of possessing  a  savings account or using credits and loans, households reported participating in the
following  transactions  -- either  saving  or dissaving  or taking  on credits  and loans or paying  them back.
s  Following  Lancaster's  (1990) condition  that any time-invariant  regressor is necessarily  exogenous,  all
fixed-time  factors  (on the basis  of their equality  during  the studied  period)  that are included  in the model  -
such as marital  status  or type of family,  or receipt  of and access  to transfers  or non-income  sources  - can be
considered  exogenous  rather  than endogenous.
32Finally, dummies for each year during which it was possible to observe the beginning of
a poverty spell (in other words, for the years  1994, 1995, and  1996, with  1994 omitted) were
included. They were meant to represent the effects of overall economic conditions (the 'business
cycle') on the probability of the household moving out of poverty (or falling into it), as well as the
aggregate effect of changes in government policy on social transfers.
Empirical Results
The empirical results are presented in two steps. First, the overall changes in the survival
parameters are briefly discussed, emphasizing the type of family variable. Second, the risk factors
for poverty status over time are discussed for both inflows into and outflows from poverty under
alternative  definitions  of  consumption.  In  addition,  the  effects  of  family  allowances  and
unemployment  compensation  on  the  risks  associated  with  transition  in  and  out  of  poverty
(expressed as the differences between the cumulative hazard function for the case of "with" and
"without'  benefits) are presented in graphical form for selected groups of households. In some
cases, the survival function is also included. The detailed results of the regression model that was
used are in Table C-  and Table C-2 in Appendix C. In order to facilitate the discussion, excerpts
of these tables are presented below in Table 1.
The model was highly significant in each of its eight applications when the dependent
variable was calculated: (i) for the case of full-consumption in the context both of avoiding and
moving out of poverty; (ii) when consumption derived from all benefits (other than pensions) was
excluded  in the  context both of avoiding and  moving out of poverty;  (iii) when  consumption
derived from family allowances was excluded in the context both of avoiding and moving out of
poverty;  (iv)  when  consumption  derived  from  unemployment  benefits  was  excluded  in  the
context both of avoiding and moving out of poverty.
This made it possible to draw conclusions about the effects of social benefits and about
risk factors for  falling  into and moving  out of  poverty by comparing  the  survival parameters
estimated for these different (simulation) situations. At first glance, the overall effect of the social
benefits was sizable in both contexts of the assessment (confirming the results presented in the
previous section). As regards promotion from poverty reflected in a decline  in the  cumulative
hazard functions,  the  prospect of a  household moving  out poverty  after two  years would  be
smaller by  a factor  of about two (dropping from 2.6  to  1.4) when  benefits were  not counted
compared to when they were.  The risk of falling into poverty would also be substantially larger
without  social  benefits  - on  average,  by  about  one-third  among  the  non-poor  during  two
subsequent years (from 0. 12 to 0.17).
The household vulnerability status greatly modified the effect of benefits on the survival
parameters.  The rate of moving out of poverty was significantly  diminished,  while the risk of
falling into the poverty zone also rose considerably. Being vulnerable meant that the exit rate (for
example, for those in two-year poverty) was reduced to about 1.5 compared with 3.7 among non-
vulnerable households. So, the odds of being vulnerable were even slightly higher than the odds
in the case when benefits were not counted. In the case of falling into poverty, the disparity in the
risks was also substantial, ranging from about 0.10 among the non-vulnerable to 0.20 among the
vulnerable households.
Effects  of Benefits  on  Poverty  Transition for  Different  Types  of  Families.  Since the
distinction among different types of family is a key policy variable, this was used as "pattern"
33variable in the model. The estimates of the survival parameters differed substantially in each of
the major dimensions of comparison. 59 Figure 5 below illustrates changes in the cumulative
Figure 5: Hazard Function for Rising  Out of Poverty with  and without Counting  Social
Benefits by Type of Family
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Figure  6: Hazard  Function  for  Falling  into  Poverty  with  and  without  Counting  Social
Benefits by Type of Family
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hazard function for transition  in and out of poverty due to excluding all social benefits
among households with different compositions (including single-person households).
More  detailed  results,  in  a  form  of  series  of  figures  which  include  households'
vulnerability  status  without  counting  family  allowances  and  unemployment  benefits  in  the
context  of transitions  into  and out  of  poverty,  are available  from  the  author.  This  variation
between different types of households was greatly heightened when their vulnerability status was
taken into account.  It accords with the observation made earlier that the overall effect of social
benefits differed substantially between vulnerable and other households (being generally higher
59 There  are 16 major  dimensions  of comparisons  {two  contexts  of the assessment  (inflow into and outflow
from poverty)}  x  {four  definitions  of consumption  and poverty  pattern  over  time ("with" and "without"  all
benefits with specifications  for family allowances  and unemployment  benefits)} x  (two strata by the
vulnerability  status  of household}.
34among vulnerable households). And also with the fact that the two variables - vulnerability and
household composition - modified each other's impact on household poverty status over time.
Among  vulnerable  households,  the  rate  of  moving  out  of  poverty  would  decline
dramatically  and become practically  indistinguishable among the  different  family types  if the
benefits were not counted (at least not until they had spent about two years in poverty). This held
in  each of the three  "without-benefits"  situations, that  is, when  either  all  benefits  or  family
allowances or unemployment benefits  were not counted. So, for the  poor, being vulnerable  is
even more important for reducing their probability of moving out of poverty than belonging to a
large nuclear family. This means that it may be more useful to policy practitioners to know about
a household's vulnerability status than about its composition.
However, that was not the case in the context of inflows into poverty (Figure 6). On the
contrary, the  risk  spread  even  more  widely  with  each  subsequent year  that  households with
different  family compositions stayed out of poverty in the case of the  vulnerable compared to
non-vulnerable  households.  60  A  firm  pattern  emerged  from  the  comparison  of the  hazard
functions  between  the  households  of different  family  compositions,  and  the  pattern  remains
consistent in the different simulation situations (in other words, under alternative definitions of
consumption --  details available from the author). As expected, the order of the different types of
family was reversed in both contexts.
Among poor households, either vulnerable or not, the lowest exit rate from poverty was
for families with three  or more children, followed by "other" families with children (including
single-parent  families  and  grandparents  with  children).  At  the  other  extreme,  the  group  of
households that was best placed for rising out of chronic poverty was married couples without
children  and single-person households. Small nuclear families  (with one or two children)  and
families without children fell in between these two extremes.
In the  case of inflow into poverty, the order was exactly  reversed, with  families with
three  or more children  and  single-parent families  facing the  greatest risk of being poor while
single-person households and childless married couples were the least endangered. Small nuclear
families and families without children again fell in between these two extremes.
To assess the impact of social benefits, the differences between the cumulative  hazard
functions  calculated  under  alternative  definitions  of  consumption  can  be  compared  for  the
different types of families. Generally, the chances of exiting poverty for vulnerable households
were  reduced by  much  more than  those  for  non-vulnerable households  when  benefit-derived
consumption  was not counted, being somewhat bigger when unemployment  benefits  were not
counted  than  when  family  allowances  were  not  counted.  Non-vulnerable  households  would
experience the same reduction in their chances of rising out of poverty in both cases (that is, when
either family allowances or unemployment benefits were not counted).
For instance, withdrawing family  allowances from poor 20th month single parents and
non-parent  families  with  children  (that  is. other  than  nuclear  families  with  children) would
diminish their exit rate from poverty from about 1.2  to about 0.6 among vulnerable households
and from 3.0 to 2.0 among non-vulnerable households (the appropriate graphs are available from
60  Incidently,  the pattem for the risk of falling into poverty  among non-vulnerable  households  when the
benefits were not counted  was, in each of the three simulated  situations,  very similar to that shown by
vulnerable  households  in the actual situation  (with all benefits included).  Thus, it can be concluded  that
withdrawing  social benefits  from the budget of non-vulnerable  households  would reduce their ability to
cope  with the risk of poverty  to the level of vulnerable  households  receiving  benefits.  (After surviving  for
at least two years outside  the poverty  zone, the risk of poverty  that would be faced by non-vulnerable
households  without  benefits  would  still  not exceed  of the risk  faced  by vulnerable  recipient  families).
35the  author). Among non-vulnerable households, the drop in the exit rate when  unemployment
benefits were not counted was practically the same as when family allowances were not counted.
However, this difference was somewhat bigger among vulnerable households.
The changes in the risk of falling into poverty (which can be approximated in a similar
way  as above - details  are available  from the  author) were  also bigger when  unemployment
allowances were not counted than when family allowances were not counted, but only among the
vulnerable. Among the non-vulnerable, there was no difference between the effect of these two
benefits.
For instance, in the case of a non-vulnerable, married couple with three or more children
who stay out of poverty for 20 months, their hazard to poverty would increase from 0.16 under
full consumption  to 0.20 if family allowances were not counted  and to 0.20 if unemployment
benefits were not counted. If this family were vulnerable, the risk would rise from 0.23 with all
benefits counted to 0.27 and to 0.30 if family allowances and unemployment benefits respectively
were not counted.
These  comparisons  (which  can  be  extended  to  all  of  the  categories  of  household
composition) illustrate one way to assess the effectiveness of a particular kind of social transfer
either in helping the poor to escape from poverty or in enhancing other households' abilities to
avoid  poverty. 61 Two  other  ways  - comparing  the  relative  risks  and  comparing  cumulative
hazards - are discussed below.
Risk Factors and the Effects  of Social Benefits on Long-term Poverty.  Table  I below
presents the exponential values of the hazard function's coefficients of the predictor variables (eJZ
calculated at the mean of covariates). These results confirm, first of all, the asymmetrical nature
of transitions  in and out of poverty. Among the most prominent examples of the asymmetrical
risk factors  - which contribute differently to the exit rate from poverty than to the risk of falling
into poverty - are: the  educational  achievement  of the  household head (other  than  university
diploma holders), the type  of family  (other than single-person households and married couples
without children), the household's  socioeconomic group (other than employees and pensioners),
the household head's  sector of employment (especially when all benefits were not counted), the
household's receipt of either private or public transfers, and its possession of a savings account.
On  the other  hand,  in  addition to  the  characteristics  mentioned  above  in  parenthesis
(some of them  are simply  reference categories),  certain factors  act in fairly  symmetrical way,
contributing to a similar extent to the hazards in both directions. These include: the age, gender,
and marital status of the household head (except when all benefits were excluded), having access
to  credits and  loans (except when  family  allowances were  not counted);  and  the  presence of
disabled person in household. 62
61  This way is possible only if a predictor  has been used as a pattern variable, for which the program
calculates  cumulative  hazard  functions.
62  Generally,  if a coefficient  is lower than unity in the column  "enter,"  the variable  (or category)  is a real
risk factor for entering poverty (compared  to a reference group). When it is in the column "exit," it
indicates  a greater  chance  of rising out of poverty  (compared  to a reference  category).
36Table 1: The Hazard Function's Coefficients of Risk Factors for Falling into and Moving
Out of Poverty under Alternative Definitions of Consumption (exponential values)
Total  If not counted consumption derived from:
Consumption
Poverty  All social  Family  Unemployment
benefits  Allowances  benefits
Variables (Covariates)  Poverty  Poverty  Poverty
Exit  Entry  Exit  Entry  Exit  Entry  Exit  Entry
Head of Household
Age  .999  .993  .998  .995  1.000  .993  1.000  .992
Education Achievement
Elementary or below  .683  3.287  .660  3.674  .634  3.471  .694  3.327
Vocational orhigh  .689  2.814  .671  3.048  .652  2.936  .719  2.720
School incomplete
High school or  .678  2.058  .693  2.099  .643  2.068  .715  1.854
University incomplete
University (omitted)
Femalehead  1.041  1.015  1.142  .882  1.015  .967  1.126  .943
Marital Status
Never married  1.252  1.111  .952  1.144  1.109  1.047  1.100  1.212
Married  1.027  1.060  .955  1.128  1.001  1.100  1.024  1.090
Widowed  .870  .869  .670  1.074  .785  .905  .832  .877
Divorced (omitted)
Family Type
Marriedwithoutchildren  1.008  1.019  1.105  1.062  1.031  1.179  1.023  1.033
Married and 1-2 children  .947  1.276  .820  1.544  .816  1.618  .877  1.341
Married and 3 or more  .786  2.348  .686  2.470  .617  2.654  .772  2.258
Children
Other with children  .834  1.658  .784  1.819  .781  1.897  .743  1.730
Other without children  .958  1.208  .882  1.271  .983  1.264  .814  1.329
Single person HH
(omitted)
Disable person i HH  .984  1.047  1.007  1.071  .991  1.058  .955  1.083
Head's  employment sector
Public sector  .892  1.138  .797  1.321  .954  1.320  .726  1.362
Private sector  .914  .994  .873  1.163  1.005  1.136  .823  1.130
Socioeconomic  group
Employees  .872  .953  1.256  .754  .924  .948  1.053  .768
Farmers and a mixed group  .889  1.013  .956  .849  .855  .931  .917  .937
Self-employed  .877  1.190  1.083  .905  .852  1.250  .988  .848
Welfare recipients  .848  1.660  .744  1.213  .766  1.120  .678  2.436
Pensioners (omitted)
Financial  assets and transfers (incidence)
Savings account  1.001  1.317  1.076  1.244  1.008  1.343  .974  1.220
Using credit and loan  .796  .796  .931  .955  1.113  .806  .822  .829
Private transfer  .949  1.561  1.211  1.432  .963  1.605  1.090  1.430
Public transfer  .905  1.121  .865  1.089  .818  1.165  .923  1.067
Poverty spell began
In 1995  .552  .128  .498  .169  .522  .145  .536  .158
In 1996  .321  .221  .328  .256  .339  .232  .359  .249
In 1994 (omitted)
37This illustrates what kind of recommendations can be made regarding policies that would
take into account temporal differences in need (as represented here by the risk factors).  Policies
aimed  at  lifting  households out of poverty would  be more effective  if they  focused  on those
households characterized by asymmetrical factors whose chances of moving out of poverty were
lower than others, especially if, at the same time, their risk of falling into poverty  were higher
than  others. This point is expanded below  in the course of developing a typology of factors in
terms of their contribution to poverty mobility.
However, while comparing the coefficients of the hazard functions in Table I that refer to
both  inflows  into and  outflows from  poverty,  it should be kept  in mind  that  the households
involved in each case constitute two different groups that only overlap to some extent with each
other  and  are far from being  identical. 63 Therefore, the  coefficients  are not fully  comparable
between the two contexts, and they are more often statistically significant in the case of falling
into poverty than of moving out of it.
To continue the discussion about the influence of household composition and the head's
marital status, the  relative  risks associated with each category - for  either  exiting poverty  or
falling into it - were fully compatible with the patterns discussed earlier.  Families with three or
more children had the lowest likelihood of moving out of poverty, and their chances of doing so
would  drop to  0.6  if family  allowances  were  not counted  from  0.8  under  full consumption,
compared with households of unrelated individuals (a reference category). They were followed
closely b6y other  families with children,  within which there  was a  prevalence of single-parent
families. 4  Families with three or more children also had the highest relative risk of falling into
poverty, ranging from 2.3 to 2.7 times higher if unemployment benefits  and family allowances
respectively were not counted. The analogous risk was also very high for single-parent families
(1.7 and  1.9 respectively),  followed by nuclear  families with  up to  two children  (1.3 and  1.6
respectively).  Households  consisting  of married  couples  without  children  and  households  of
unrelated individuals were the least endangered by poverty or, once in poverty, had the highest
exit rate from it.  The rate  for households consisting  of married couples without  children  was
slightly better than the rate for households of unrelated individuals, especially when all benefits
were excluded.
Poor single-person households were fairly  diverse in terms of the survival parameters.
Two categories of marital status predominated among this group of householders - those who had
never married (about one-fifth) and those who were widowed (about two-thirds),  and these two
groups represented  the opposite ends of the spectrum of relative  risks.  Those who  had  never
married had the highest probability of escaping from poverty, while those who were widowed had
the lowest probability. Those in the married category fell in between and were almost the same as
those in the divorced category, which  was a reference  group. This  order remained  unchanged
whether social benefits were counted or not.
63  The group  of the poor consisted  of households  who began their poverty spell during the period under
study,  being much smaller  (about 18  percent of the sample)  and less  heterogeneous  than those included  in
the analysis  of the risk of falling  into poverty.  The latter  group  includes  those who were originally  non-poor
and who either eventually  became  poor or survived  outside  the poverty  zone throughout  the whole period
(71 percent  of the sample).
64  The fact that the group of other families with children (including single-parent  families) was in a
somewhat  better situation  compared  to large families  with children  may reflect the fact that single-parent,
low-income  families  benefit  from the reduced  personal  income tax (since 1993).  The issue of how tax and
social  benefits  affect  the long-term  economic  outlook  of the household  may be of further analytical  interest
but is not explored  here.
38In contrast  to the type  of household,  no symmetrical pattern  (of the hazard function's
coefficients) was shown by the head's marital status in the case of households' transitions into and
out of poverty respectively. The households of widowed people (who are the most disadvantaged
group among  the  poor) had  the  smallest risk of falling  into poverty.  On the  other hand, the
households of people who had never been married had the highest risk of being  impoverished,
and  this  risk became  particularly  high  when  unemployment  benefits  were  not counted.  This
accords with the point made earlier that the relative odds of being vulnerable are greater (by about
two times) among single-person households compared to others.  These two groups of households
- headed by widowed people and those headed by people who had never married  - presented
diametrically  different  patterns  of poverty  mobility.  The highest  poverty  turnover  was found
among  those households with  a  head  who had  never  married and the  lowest  risk  was found
among those households with widowed heads.
Again, this illustrates another type of policy recommendation that can be made based on
this kind of analysis -- namely, that policy interventions aimed at helping households to move out
of  poverty  would  be  more  effective  if  they  focused  on  (if  the  benefits  were  targeted  to)
households headed by widowed people rather than  on those headed by people who had  never
married. However, for policies aimed  at helping  households to avoid  falling into poverty, the
focus should be on households with heads  who had never married. The data showed that these
recommendations  would be  especially  relevant  in  situations where  the  heads  who  had  never
married were younger and the widowed heads were older than average in the sample (as is likely
to be the case in reality).
The presence of a disabled person  in a household does not affect the household's hazard,
except that it slightly lowers the chances of poor households moving out of poverty and slightly
increases their risk of falling into the poverty zone. There would be a small increase in the rate of
moving into and out of poverty if no social benefits were counted. This suggests that households
that  include  a  disabled  person have  greater  poverty  mobility  than  others  when  benefits  are
reduced (other than pensions, including disability pension).
The age of the household head did not significantly affect household survival parameters
in the context  of poverty exit,  regardless  of whether  or not the benefits  were  included  in  the
household welfare measure. One of the reasons was revealed when the age cohorts were used in
the place of the age variable. They showed a U-shaped pattern, with heads aged 51-65 having the
lowest  chances of exiting the  poverty zone. This may reflect the fact that  the poor in the pre-
retirement  age  cohort  are,  generally,  less  likely to  take  advantage  of  such  opportunities  as
retraining or getting a new job or relocating to find a better-paying job.  This pattern became more
linear in the case of falling into poverty - the excess risk of falling into the poverty zone declined
with  each additional year  of the head's  age. However, this  was significant only  in the case  of
unemployment  benefits, indicating that younger  households (who  were over-represented among
the unemployed) depend to a larger extent on this type of benefit and would be in bigger danger of
becoming poor if they no longer received them.
The gender of the head is almost neutral for household survival parameters under the full
consumption  definition  of  household  welfare.  However,  if  social  benefits  were  not  counted,
female-headed households would consistently be better off than male-headed households.  Female-
headed households had a lower hazard to poverty and, once in poverty, they also exited  it faster
than male-headed households. The major reason for this seems to be, all other things  being equal,
the stronger  effect of unemployment  on the  welfare of households headed by  men versus those
headed by women, as reflected here by  unemployment benefits (which had a bigger effect than
family  allowances).  This  is suggested  by the  fact that  male-headed  households  had  a  smaller
chance  (by  about  13 percent)  of moving  out of  poverty  when employment  benefits  were  not
counted  than  female-headed  households.  Thus,  the  risk  of falling  into  poverty would  also be
39somewhat  higher for  male-  than  female-headed  household,  especially,  if  all  benefits  were  not
counted.
Education is the strongest predictor of a household's poverty survival parameters among
all  human capital variables.  This is consistent with  evidence that there  is a  strong association
between  education and  the duration of unemployment  in Poland  (Cazes  and Scarpetta,  1998).
Workers with a higher education have the best chance of getting a job while those with a primary
education or less have the least likelihood of becoming employed and, while being unemployed,
they have the highest chance of becoming unemployed.
The relative  risk of falling into poverty was up to  3.5 times  higher among households
with heads with only an elementary school diploma or less compared to the reference group of
university diploma holders. Among the poor, the poverty exit rates were consistent with this. For
every 10 households headed by university diploma holders that left the poverty zone, there were
only six to seven households with heads  with any  other level of education who  did the  same.
However, the statistical significance of the particular level of the head's education was confined
to inflows into poverty as the exit rate from poverty was basically flat among all households other
than those households headed by university diploma holders.
Access to credits and accumulated assets presented a rather complex pattern. Households
that had taken advantage of credits or loans demonstrated a pattern of poverty status over time
that was directly opposite to the pattern of those households that could drew on their savings (in
both  cases,  on a  permanent  basis,  in  each year).  At  first  glance,  it  seemed  that  households
possessing savings accounts had both a larger and a quicker turnover into and out of poverty than
the households that borrowed money.
It  became  clear that  poor households  were  borrowing  money  from  basically  private
sources  as only one out of every seven households among those that were permanent  users of
credits or loans borrowed from a formal financial institution. As previously suggested, the poor,
who typically have no  assets, are forced to act in this way (as their last hope of escaping from
poverty) due to their liquidity constraints rather than being motivated by a desire to optimize their
long-run economic prospects. However, in general, this does not help them as the data showed
that  money borrowers had  a lower  exit rate from poverty than poor households that were  not
borrowing money from others. (This accords with the negative association between using credits
and the number of years in poverty, which was discussed earlier.) Only when family allowances
were not counted were the borrowers somewhat relatively better-off, which indicates that these
benefits were a more significant source of income to those poor households that were not getting
private loans than to those who were.  By contrast, among the non-poor, borrowing money seems
to act as an effective safety net preventing them from falling into poverty. The risk to borrowers
of falling into poverty was smaller by about one-quarter than the risk to those households that had
not borrowed money.
Possessing a savings account did not much help poor households to move out of poverty,
and their exit rate would only be slightly higher if benefits were not counted65 On the contrary,
non-poor households that engaged in such transactions (and that could drew on their savings) had
a generally  higher risk of falling  into poverty (up to about  one-third) than  those who  did not
report possessing a savings account. Despite being barely significant, this observation seems to
contradict the finding that households that did not possess a savings account were more likely to
be poor (by about a half) than to be non-poor. The most likely explanation for this is the fact that,
among those who had some accumulated assets, dissaving was commonly used (albeit not always
65  For instance,  Glewwe  and Hall (1995) also did not find any evidence  that savings had an impact  on
vulnerability.
40successfully) when the household's risk of falling into poverty increased due to such events as a
household member  losing a job  or another reduction in the household's  income. In this sense,
savings would act in a way similar to transfers, both public and private, as discussed below.
Another explanation may be the fact that the dummy used here referred to the occurrence
of transactions  but not  to  the  amounts  involved  in  those  transactions  or to  the  size  of the
accumulated assets. On the other hand, the paradox of contra-cyclical savings (as discussed by
Deaton, 1991, who argued that savings rise when  income is falling  and that savings fall when
income is rising) is not implausible here. This point is discussed below  in connection with the
cumulative hazard.
The receipt of  transfers,  private  as well  as public, was associated with  a  consistently
higher risk for falling into poverty than that faced by non-recipients throughout the whole study
period. Those who received private transfers had about a 40 to 60 percent higher risk of falling
into poverty when unemployment  benefits or family allowances respectively were not counted.
This accords with the predictions of Cox and others (1997) that inter-household transfers may fill
a significant portion of the income gap left by unemployment or by reduced public transfers. The
pattern  was  somewhat  mixed  in  the  case  of  the  poor.  Their  receipt  of  transfers  did  not
significantly modify their chances of exiting poverty. The reason for this may be that a principle
of  exchange  rather  than  charity  seems  to  motivate  poor  households  to  participate  in  inter-
household transfers (as such a motive seems to be more likely among "equals") and that all low-
income households experienced a downturn in their economic welfare  at about the same time.
Some increase  in their chances for exit (by about one-fifth) was seen when no  social benefits
were counted; a similar tendency was also shown when unemployment benefits were not counted.
Permanent participation in public transfers (during four years), which is common among
the chronically poor and was previously shown to be an indicator of high welfare  dependency,
was again  associated here  with  a  low exit  rate from  poverty. The chances  of escaping  from
poverty were reduced by much more when family allowances were not counted (by about one-
fifth) than when unemployment benefits were not counted. This reflects the fact that the fraction
of households receiving the family allowances during the four-year period was much larger than
the fraction of permanent recipients of unemployment benefits.
When the effects of receiving private and public transfers were compared, it became clear
that the transfers complemented each other rather than substituting for each other because they
had different effects on the transition in and out of poverty. Inter-household transfers were more
important for preventing a recipient household from falling into poverty than for helping them to
exit poverty, whereas recipients of social benefits were more strongly affected in terms of their
chances of exiting poverty than of avoiding poverty. 66
Socioeconomic groups presented a more diverse pattern of the effect of social benefits on
the household survival parameters than did the other covariates. Among the poor, the exit rates
were relatively flat and low among all groups compared to pensioners (a left category) under the
full consumption  definition  of welfare.  However,  in each of the three  simulation  situations
(without  counting  all  benefits,  without  counting  family  allowances,  and  without  counting
unemployment compensation), the results varied. Only the group of households for whom social
welfare was their main source of maintenance was consistently at the bottom of the list in terms
66 This is not surprising  in light of the fact  that a large  portion  of private  transfers  were given and received
between  households  with similar  levels  of welfare.  Also,  earlier studies  (Cox et al, 1997)  found  that there
was a significant decrease in transfer amounts during the transition, as most households experienced
downturns  about  the same  time.
41of  their  chances  of  escaping  poverty.  Households  living  on  wages  or  on  non-farm  self-
employment  income had more chance of moving out of poverty than others (including farmers
and pensioners) when no benefits were counted.
The pattern in the case of inflow into poverty was somewhat different. The relative risks
of impoverishment were fairly differentiated among the various socioeconomic groups under the
full consumption scenario but became less differentiated when benefits were not counted, being
generally  lower  than  among  pensioners.  When  benefits  were  not  counted,  the  pensioner
households are not any better off than other households except for the welfare  recipients who
consistently had the highest risk of falling into poverty.
When the patterns of risk for the various groups of falling into poverty or, in the case of
poor households, of rising out of poverty were compared, this suggested that pensioners were the
only group that  could potentially (when social benefits  were not counted) be characterized  by
high poverty mobility.  However, there was a  big difference  in terms  of turnover  among poor
households -- it was much higher among the households of employees and the self-employed than
among poor households of farmers or welfare recipients. (It is worth noting that there seemed to
be a bigger difference in this respect between the rich and poor farmer households, who generally
had  relatively  low  rates  of  both  poverty  entry  and  exit,  compared  with  other  groups  of
households.)
The sector of employment of the head of household was defined as either the public or the
private sectors of the  economy throughout the entire  period under study  (with pensioners and
others as a left category). It shows that households headed by private-sector employees were in a
somewhat  more  favorable  situation  than  those  headed by  the  public-sector  employees.  Poor
households  consisting  of  private-sector  employees  had  a  slightly  higher  chance  of  escaping
poverty,  but  this  advantage  was  statistically  significant  only  in  the  case  of  unemployment
benefits.  Their  relative  risk  of  falling  into  the  poverty  zone  was  also  lower,  both  when
unemployment benefits and when family allowances were not counted.
The bigger discrepancy between the exit rates into and out of the poverty zone among
households headed by the public-sector employees indicates that there was generally less poverty
mobility in this group than among households with private-sector heads. The risk of falling into
poverty increased and the chance of escaping poverty decreased significantly among both groups
of households when social benefits, particularly, unemployment benefits, were not counted. The
households living on  labor  income were, therefore, generally  more  sensitive in terms  of their
survival parameters to changes in social transfers, especially  in regard to the benefits associated
with the head's employment  status, than were all other households. Their relative risk of either
falling  into poverty or of staying in  long-term poverty increased substantially  if  such benefits
were lowered. This accords with the patterns of hazard among different socioeconomic groups.
The relative advantage enjoyed by households headed by private-sector workers may be
due to both objective  and subjective elements.  First, jobs  in the private  sector generally  yield
higher returns than those in the public sector do (Rutkowski, J., 1996). However, this premium of
private over public sector pay began to decline in the mid-1990s when the overall performance of
many of state-owned companies  began to improve  (Newell and  Socha,  1998). Also,  both the
highest  paid  group  of jobs  and  the  lowest  paid  group  of jobs  were  in  the  private  sector
(Rutkowski,  1998), which  means that  the private  sector had bigger  wage disparities than  the
67  This group  was, however,  relatively  the most volatile  as only about 40 percent of households  lived on
welfare  benefits  as the main source  of maintenance  during  the whole  period  under study.
42public sector. 68 The second reason for the relative advantage enjoyed by households headed by
private-sector workers may be because these heads had better job-seeking skills due to having had
experience in the private sector. People  with such experience are reported to have  a smoother
transition from unemployment to employment (Cazes and Scarpetta, 1998).
The year  in which  a household fell  into poverty yields two types of information. It is
relevant not only in terms of how healthy the overall economy was at the time and of what stage
of development the country's  social protection systems were at the time, but it also  indicates a
tendency in the relative risks among the time-events  -- either falling into or exiting poverty.
For those in poverty, the later a household entered the poverty zone, the harder it was to
leave it. So, those who began their poverty spell in 1995 found it twice  as hard to move out of
poverty as those impoverished in 1994 (a reference year), and it was three times harder for those
who began poverty in  1996, the  last year  being studied. For those who  avoided  poverty until
1995, the relative risk of falling into poverty was about eight times lower than those who fell into
poverty in 1994, but the risk was twice as large for those who survived outside poverty until the
subsequent year, 1996.
Using these Results
The remaining part of this paper, which is devoted to a further discussion of the results
summarized in Table 1, is explicitly written from the point of view of a social policymaker.This
is in order to illustrate the way in which these results can be used to solve some of the most
difficult, yet largely neglected, policy problems (signaled in the Introduction) that are involved in
the question of how to improve the overall performance of the safety nets in the face of the long-
run poverty.
After reviewing  how  household-level  risk factors  affected transitions  into and  out of
poverty, it was then possible to look at the differences between the hazards associated with each
of the analyzed categories (risk factors) and to analyze them in the context of four possible social
policy  interventions:  making  no  change  in  the  social  protection  system  - reducing  family
allowances - reducing unemployment benefits - reducing all social benefits (other than pensions).
As  was  occasionally  illustrated  above,  such  comparisons  can  be  interpreted
straightforwardly in terms of poverty mobility, in other words, how a particular characteristic of a
household  combined with  a  change  in the  social  benefit  system  determines  the  household's
poverty status over time.  From a policy evaluation standpoint, the results of this exercise can be
used to  demonstrate  (in  a  measurable way)  how  a  particular change  in the  social  protection
system  will  affect  the  poverty  survival  capacities  of  a  given,  policy-relevant  category  of
households (compared to the poverty survival parameters of those in a complementary category).
Both poverty mobility and the effectiveness of the safety nets in dealing with  long-term
poverty were used as criteria for evaluating the social protection system in this  analysis of the
dynamics of poverty and social transfer receipt. This approach seemed to be the most likely to
yield the necessary suggestions for designing social policies that take into account the long-run
economic outlook  of the  poor households. The two ways of using  these results  are discussed
below.
Poverty Mobility.  A  summary  of how the  variables  that represent  a household's  risk-
coping  capacity (including human  and non-human asset endowments) affect  its poverty status
over time under different policy interventions is presented in Diagram 2 below. The typology of
68 Among  the heads of households  in the panel,  the median  wage in the private  sector  was lower  than in the
public  sector  during  the period  being studied.
43Diagram 2: The Effect on Poverty Mobility of Household-level Risk Factors: Comparing the
Hazards (Relative Risks) of Falling into and Moving Out of Poverty
POVERTY  EXIT
High  Low
A. (High poverty mobility and  B.
possibly high turnover among
the poor)  *  Head with lower than
university diploma
*  Head never married  *  Family of married couple
*  Head married  with 3 or more children
*  Family of married couple  *  Single-parent and other family
without children  with children
*  HH possesses savings account  *  Disabled person in HH
*  HH participates in private  *  Head employed in public sector
transfer network  *  HH participates in public transfer
*  Central region  *  HH of welfare recipients
*  HH of pensioners
*  South West region
*  Central East region
*  Central West region
*  North East region
C.  D.(Low poveity mobility and
possibly low turnover among
*  Head holds university diploma*  the poor)
*  Head female
H  *  HH of single-perlson  *  Head widowed
*  HH of employees  *  Head divorced
o  ;  *  HH of self-employed  *  HH using credits or loans (private)
*  Capital region  *  HH of farmers (including
*  South region  mixed' group)
*  North region  *  South East
Notes: This  typology  is based on the patterns  of hazards  emerging  in the simulations  (without  benefits).
* The reference  categories  are (in the case of multi-categorical  variables):  head divorced;  head holding university
diploma;  single-person  household;  households  of pensioners;  South  West  region.
Poverty mobility (predicted) is high among households  with prevalence  of the characteristics  associated  with high
relative  risks for poverty  entry. If it is accompanied  by high probability  of exiting  poverty  there might be expected
also  high turnover  among  the poor households  with  such characteristics;  otherwise  it may lead to persistent  poverty.
Poverty persistence is high among  households  with a prevalence  of the characteristics  associated  with low exit rate
from poverty.  If its is accompanied  by low hazard to poverty  there might  be expected  also low tumover among  the
poor households  with  these characteristics.
44the household-level  risk factors  for poverty  mobility and  poverty persistence  is  based on  the
coefficients of the hazard function associated with each category of the analyzed variables (as
discussed above). Since it was done both for inflows into and outflows from the poverty zone, the
categories  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of the  contribution that  each of  them  has  made  to  a
household's poverty mobility or to poverty persistence as follows: 69
*  A characteristic contributes to poverty mobility if it is associated with a higher
relative risk of both falling into and moving out of poverty, while conversely
mobility is low if the relative risk is lower in both situations. Examples of
characteristics associated with high mobility are the variable categories mentioned
inquarter A of Diagram 2 (for example, if the head of the household has never
married or  is employed in the private sector or if the household receives inter-
household transfers).
*  A characteristic contributes to poverty persistence if it is associated with a lower
relative chance of moving out of poverty. It also contributes to a low overall turnover
among the poor. Examples include the variable categories mentioned in quarter D of
Diagram 2 (if the head of the household is widowed or if the household is a farming
household;  however, given a high overall poverty rate in the latter group, one may
expect that the turnover among the poor households in this group may also be high).
The typology illustrated in Diagram 2 takes into account patterns of influence under different
simulated conditions and, as such, it gives only an approximation of a real situation. 70 The ability
to identify those who would be relatively better off or worse off (vis-a-vis a reference category) if
a  given  change  in  the  social  benefits  were  made  provides  an  invaluable  tool  for  policy
practitioners  concerned about  long-run  poverty. However, they  may  also  be interested  in the
effect on chronic poverty of a change in absolute terms in the overall risk of falling into poverty,
or chance of moving out of poverty. This is discussed below.
Social Benefits and Poverty Survival Parameters for  Different  Groups.  The cumulative
hazard  function  and  the  survival  function  - calculated  under  the  alternative  definitions  of
consumption (with and without benefit-derived consumption) - constitute new variables that can
be used to assess the effects of changes in the social benefit system on the households poverty
status over time.7 1 This can be done in a straightforward way by comparing the means of these
two variables for various groups that are of policy interest. For instance, the chance of rising out
of poverty for poor households of employees would drop by 28 percent if no social benefits were
counted. It would drop by  17 percent and by  12 percent if unemployment  benefits and  family
allowances were not counted respectively, as it can be seen from Figure 7a.
The analogous figures  for the  case  of unemployment  benefits, according to  the  same
graph  were:  11 percent  for  farmers;  15 percent  for  pensioners,  and  25  percent  for the  self-
69  In both cases, the term "contributes"  has one of two possible  meanings,  depending  on the substantive
interpretation  of the covariate: (i) it may imply a causal link (for instance,  "holding  a university  degree
reduces the risk of falling into poverty")  or (ii) it may only indicate that the event coincided  with the
poverty  exit or entrance  as a correlate  of either of the two (for instance,  "participation  in private  transfers
suggests  that the household is in danger of falling into poverty" or "long-term  receipt of public transfers
indicates  that  the household  is poor.").
70  In fact, the poverty  mobility/persistence  risk factors identified  above can easily be listed separately  for
family allowances,  for unemployment  benefits,  and for aggregated  social benefits.  When compared  with
the actual  situation  (counting  all benefits),  it would  make  it possible  to construct  a more accurate  typology
of factors  for poverty  exit and entrance.
71  For households  that are not included,  these data are "missing."
45employed. In each of these groups, excluding unemployment benefits would, on average, have a
somewhat bigger impact on their ability to move out of poverty than if family allowances were
excluded. The relatively large effect of a change in unemployment benefits among households of
self-employed  accords  with  the  fact  that  many  of  the  recipients  of  these  benefits  were
unemployed people attempting to start a small (family) business. The group of households living
on  welfare  as  main  source  of  maintenance  (welfare  recipients)  was  not  included  in  this
comparison because a very  small fraction of them  remained in this  category  during the entire
period being studied.
The chances  of falling  into poverty  were more  differentiated  among  groups  than  the
chances  of  moving  out of  poverty,  as  presented  in  Figure  7b.  Households  associated with
agriculture had a much higher risk of being impoverished than all  of the other groups.  When
tested  with  one-way  ANOVA,  the  differences  between  socioeconomic  groups  in  terms  of
poverty hazards were statistically significant in each of the four situations. In the case of poverty
exit,  the  differences  were  significant  only  in  two  situations - when  either  all  benefits  or
unemployment benefits were not counted.72  This accords with an earlier impression that the poor
are generally less heterogeneous than the non-poor, both in the sense of households' capacities to
exit poverty and in the sense of the probability of remaining in poverty for the next instance. This
probability is also, on average, less differentiated than the probability of staying out of poverty.
72 The same  thing happens  in many other  cases, as the number  of characteristics  by which the households'
chances  of falling  into poverty  varied  significantly  was much bigger than the number  of characteristics  by
which  households  differed  with  respect  to moving  out of poverty.
46Figure 7: Cumulative Hazards for Poverty Exit and Entry under Alternative Definitions of
Consumption by Socioeconomic Groups
(a)  Poverty Exit  (b) Poverty Entry
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Figure 8: Cumulative Hazards for Poverty Exit and Entry under Alternative Definitions of
Consumption by Type of Family
(a)  Poverty Exit  (b) Poverty Entry
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In addition to Figure 7a and 7b and 8a and 8b, presenting the hazard to and out-of poverty
for socioeconomic groups and types of family, respectively, a  series of figures  in Appendix C
demonstrates  these  facts:  Figures  C-la  and  C-lb  for  region;  Figures  C-2E and  C-2b  for  the
household head's  educational achievements; Figures C-3a and C-3b for the household size and
the  dependency  ratio;  and  Figures  C-4a and  C4b  for  the  age  of the  household  head.  The
dimensions along  which  households' abilities  to  exit  poverty  are differentiated  in  statistically
significant way - at least in some of the simulation conditions discussed here - while being also
significant in the case of poverty entry involve the following characteristics:
*  Socioeconomic  groups.  Households  of  pensioners  followed  by  households  of
employees,  led the transition  out of poverty. Households of farmers, followed by  a
mixed group (farmer- workers) faced the highest risk of falling into the poverty zone
(Figures 7a and 7b). The 'survival' in poverty was not significantly differentiated, but
47it varied significantly among those outside the poverty zone, with the self-employed,
followed by pensioners and employees, being the relatively least endangered (results
available from the author).
Type offamily.  Families without children other than childless married couples were
the most likely to escape from poverty, while single-parent families  were the least
likely. In terms of the survival function, the order was reversed among poor families
- the single-parent families stayed longer in poverty than others (Figures 8a and 8b).
The households that were most likely to stay out of poverty were married couples
without children and other families without children. All families with children were
less likely than others to remain out of poverty, while other households with children
and  lone-parent families were least likely to survive outside the poverty zone with
each next month (more detailed information available from the author on request).
*  Locality and  region. Although  the chance of staying  out of poverty  did not vary
significantly among the different locality categories, there was a significant increase
in the  survival  function among  the  poor either  if no  benefits  were  counted  or  if
unemployment  benefits were not counted. The poor in  large towns  and big cities
were slightly less in danger of falling into poverty than residents of small towns, but
the truly significant difference was between towns and villages (detailed information
is available  from the author or the unit on  request). On the contrary,  the regional
variation in the poverty  exit rate was significantly  affected by the  social  benefits.
Figure C-la  shows that households in central regions have gained more than eastern
regions  in terms  of  an  increased chance  of raising  out  of  the  poverty  zone  (as
demonstrated  by  the  differences  in  the  cumulative  hazard  function  between  the
situations  'with'  and  'without'  counting  social  benefits,  respectively,  for  each
region). The regions are much more differentiated with respect to the households'
risks  of falling into poverty than their chances of exiting poverty (both  'with'  and
'without'  social  benefits).  For  instance, according  to  Figure  C-lb,  households  in
North  region are generally  less endangered by  poverty than  households in eastern
regions (especially, in Central East).
The size of the household and the level of dependency. The chance of staying outside
poverty declined as the number of people in a household increased, but the decline
was  significant only  if either  all  benefits  or family  allowances  were  not counted
(Figure C-2a in Appendix C). This is consistent with the generally  greater level of
dependency in larger poor families due to the presence of children rather than adults
(potential earners) who would be eligible for unemployment benefits. An increase in
the  level of the  dependency ratio,  which did not significantly  affect the chance  of
leaving poverty, significantly  increased the  likelihood of falling  into poverty  in an
almost  linear  way  in  each  of the  four  situations  (Figure  C-2b  in  Appendix  C).
Unemployment  benefits were somewhat more important  in this respect than family
allowances  among  families  with  the  highest  level  of  dependency  - a  tendency
opposite to that observed above among the poor (suggesting their greater 'preventive'
impact than in the context of 'protection')  .
*  The age of the household's head. The hazard to poverty significantly declined as the
age cohort of the head of household decreased (Figure C-4a  in Appendix C). For
households with heads aged over 51 years old, family allowances were slightly more
important  than  unemployment  benefits.  Although  the  chances  of  moving  out  of
poverty did not differ significantly by the head's age, the probability of remaining  in
poverty  for  the  next  time  period  (month  or  year)  varied  significantly  if  either
unemployment benefits or family allowances were not counted. This probability was
48relatively lowest for the households headed by persons aged 65 and older, and was
highest for households headed by persons aged 51-65 (with households headed by
persons from 36 to 50 years old in between).
*  Savings. There was a clear pattern of a decrease in households' hazard to poverty as
the level of the (residual) savings ratio increased, and the decrease was significant for
both  the  actual  situation  and  for  each of  the  three  simulated  situations  (results
available from the author). This is consistent with the observation above about the
impact  of  the  incidence  of  savings  (indicated  by  a  household's  participation  in
savings transactions during the period under study). The pattern shown by the savings
ratio accords with the expectations that households typically draw on their savings,
including  cushioning  themselves  against  income  shocks  and  smoothing  their
consumption  (Alderman  and  Paxson,  1992; Deaton,  1991; and  Hayashi,  1997).
Hazard to outside poverty was somewhat mixed but not significant (confirming once
more that chronically poor do not possess financial assets).
Final Remarks
In order to prevent a segmentation and the social exclusion of the poor in Poland (which
is a very likely outcome of long-term poverty), it is crucially important to identify the dimensions
along which the poverty tends to be structured over time.
The summary of characteristics presented above illustrates how the results of the survival
analysis can be used to evaluate the safety net's effectiveness in dealing with long-term poverty.
Specifically, it can be used to find  out how  a change in a social  program affects the poverty
survival parameters of households belonging to a particular group.
The most general conclusion that emerges from the results presented in this paper is that
poverty, as well as vulnerability, is an intrinsically dynamic  phenomenon. Also, it needs to  be
treated by policymakers as a process that is not symmetrical as regards a household's capacity to
cope with the risks of entering poverty and remaining in it for a long period of time. In view of
this, a well-designed safety net would be one that not only reaches the poor but also recognizes
the  heterogeneity  of  need  among  households  with  different  poverty  patterns  over  time  and
provides them with help at the time they need it in order to alter their welfare trajectories.
The  microsimulation  approach  taken  in  this  paper  makes  it  possible  to  assess  the
consequences of a policy intervention that has already taken  place.  However, it also makes it
possible to evaluate the effects of any change (whether a reduction or an increase) in the social
protection system before the change is actually mad6.
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iThe set of 16 categories (groups) of households constituted a classification  called "poverty pattern"
and was constructed  on the basis of information  about whether or not a household had entered the poverty zone
and,  if  so, when and  for how  long. The poverty zone was defined as  the  lowest quintile of  household
consumption  expenditure  per equivalent adult (using the OECD coefficients: I  - householder, 0.7 other adult,
0.5 - child under  14).
ii  After a series of reforms were undertaken during 1990-91 and 1992-93,  unemployment  benefits were
rather stable throughout  the period being studied  until 1996 when further restrictions on eligibility  were imposed.
According to the most recent version, claimants are required to have been working for a minimum of 12 of the
previous 18 months, income per person in the family must be below the minimum wage, and the claimant can
refuse no more than one job offer. The duration is limited to six months (if lower than the average rate of
unemployment  in the region) and 18 months (if higher than the average unemployment  rate).
For family benefits, which are composed  of different programs, there is a set of criteria: (i) in the case
of benefits for parents raising children (under 16 or under 20 if in school) income per family member must be
below 50 percent of the average wage, and the benefit payment is flat rate (7 percent of the minimum income);
(ii) the maternity allowance  is paid to working mothers, and the payment depends on her previous wage;  (iii)
child-care allowances  go only to families whose income per member is below 25 percent of the average wage. In
the case of "other" benefits (which are sometimes included here with family benefits, some components are
family-related, such as birth grants or alimony (state-paid); other benefits such as sickness benefits for the
unemployed,  are wage-related  (80 percent of the employee's  wage).
iii Since 1996, the social assistance programs have been specified in the  questionnaire as follows:
housing supplement; social  assistance in  cash (with a  distinction between those  paid  "permanently" and
"temporarily"); assistance for women in pregnancy and for people raising children; other social assistance; and
assistance  from charity  and other non-government  institutions.
iv  For instance, the average duration of family benefits was about 40 months among households of
single-parents and  other families with children and  among nuclear  families with three or  more children,
compared  to only three months among  single-person  households.  The duration is relatively longest -- 32 months -
- among the households living on welfare and the mixed group  (farmer-workers),  followed by households of
employees  (29 months), but only 1I months among households of farmers and 9 months among pensioners. The
group of welfare recipients was the only one that received unemployment  benefits for longer than the average
(for 28 months), and households  of unrelated individuals received  these benefits for significantly  shorter periods
(only for half a month)  than family households (from about five  to eight months).
v Formally, for the case of inflow into the poverty zone, the probability  that a household enters poverty
at time ti with covariates  Z(i),  given that one of the households in R(t,)  - the set of all households who have not
yet entered the poverty  zone at a time  just  prior to t, - entered poverty at this time, is given by
Pr [household  enters poverty  at tl  one entered poverty at t;]
= Pr [household enters poverty at t, I survival to t,] / Pr[one entered at t, I survival to t 1]
= h(t 1 l Z(|  / L jeRp,tj) h(tij  Zjl
vi Survival variable  Outflows  from poverty: For transition out of poverty, the survival variable was
defined in terms of the number of months during which a household remained in the poverty zone, during the
period under study. Only those households who entered the poverty zone during that period were included,
regardless  of whether or not they completed  their poverty spell within it, that is, a right censored observation  was
treated as another state of destination.
Inflows into the poverty zone: For poverty avoidance (that is a left censored observation) the survival
variable is the number of months during which a household stayed outside of the poverty zone, since the
beginning of the period under study until it fell into the poverty zone. Included are both those households that,
after falling into poverty, remained in it for the rest of the period (if a household  began its right censored  poverty
spell) and those who experienced only a transitory or recurrent poverty (if a household completed its poverty
spell within the period, or fell into it again). However, despite of keeping the two situations as different in the
classification  of the outcome - i.e., of the status variable - the time of recurrent poverty escape was not included
into calculating  survival for the poverty  avoidance.  The reason is that confining  the calculations  to the completed
out-of-poverty  spell allows for assessing the household's  survival time before it experienced  poverty
50Time interval variable.  The four year period is divided into four 12 months intervals. For completed
poverty spell, and for right censored  observations,  the variable ranges from 0 to 36 months, excluding are left and
double  censored observations. Same  range  is  for  left  censored observations; only  for  double  censored
observations  does the variable range up to 48 months. In the case of inflows into the poverty zone, when the
intervals complement  the whole period to the time of beginning a poverty spell, the intervals are as in the first
case, from 0 to 36 (with never poor households  excluded).
Status variable.  It is built as a partition of the set of poverty patterns over time.  For outflow from
poverty, a set of five possible outcome (state of destination)  was defined: poverty spell begun and completed  -
poverty spell right censored, poverty spell left censored (and completed)  - poverty spell double censored, either
with interrupted  poverty spells (recurrent poverty) or without (permanently  poor) - and no poverty spell (never
poor cases). For inflow into the poverty zone, the set of four outcome embraced: poverty avoided (never poor
cases) - poverty spell entered and completed - poverty spell  entered and not completed - and poverty spell
entered and not interrupted  (permanently  poor).
'In this case,  the hazard function at t is conditional  on the values of Z, a vector in which assembled  are
time-invariant  regressors:  h(t;Z) =  lim  Pr(t < T < t + At I T > t,Z).
t -- >  0  At
[The hazard is determined  for the households  who are homogeneous  with respect to Z.]
viii  The  duration is limited to 6 months (if there is a lower than average rate of unemployment  in the
region) to 18 months (if there is a higher than average unemployment  rate). In the case of  family benefits it
varies greatly, the possible longest being in the case of family allowances on dependent child (until age 16, or 20
years old if in school); child-care allowances - up to age 2; sickness benefits - up to age 6 months (in an
exceptional  cases, up to age 9 months);  maternity allowances - age 16 to 26 weeks.
ix  For instance, only family allowances were slightly higher consistently  during all four years among
non-vulnerable households who entered and exited poverty during the period under study. All other benefits, as
well as all poverty groups, including  never poor, showed mixed patterns  across the years.
K  It might be of practical interest  to make a comparison  between particular  types of benefits  with respect
to their relative impact on poverty status over time while using a summary indicator.  For the case of the survival
function, one can use a complement to the unity of the ratio of the baseline value to its respective  value without
the  benefit (without counting consumption attributed to  it). While taking average over the  time  intervals
(omitting the first. 'zero' interval and the last as irrelevant) such a summary indicator would tell us about the
relative capacity of the social program in protecting  the poor against a longer-term  poverty. [For the case of the
hazard rate, the ratio needs to be reversed -- the second ('without')  to the first ('baseline")  value. However, such a
type of indicator  can be used only if a dominance between the compared parameter values is not preserved, as it
is illustrated by the case of family benefits and the baseline model. But it is useful in the other cases.] For
instance, comparison of the  survival function for the programs mentioned in Table 4 would allow one to
conclude  that unemployment  benefits alone have almost  as high an impact on protecting  the recipient  households
as the social benefits taken  jointly. Withdrawing  the former would result in an increase of the risk of staying in
prolonged  poverty  by a similar degree  (0.199) as it would be when the latter was withdrawn  (0.217). For the case
of the hazard rate, the order between the three types of benefits - with respect to their relative contribution to a
household's ability to  exit  poverty - would look as  follows: total social benefits (0.252); unemployment
compensation  (0,246); and family benefits (0.177).
x  In 1993, 5 percent out of 15.6 percent of households who reported the presence of an unemployed
member did not receive unemployment  benefit; in 1994,  the figures  was  5.7 out of 15.6  percent; in 1995 - 10.4
out of 14.6  percent, and in 1995 - 8.5 out of  12.5  percent.
xi The first group was composed of households for whom it was possible  to observe the time-to-event
that ended  when a household began its poverty spell. It means  that most of them are exactly the same households
for whom the poverty duration has already been analyzed (except for those with re3current poverty pattern as
they are also included here), with the focus now on theirs pre-poverty  history that might have lasted from one to
three years (again, for strictly computational reasons, the years are converted into months). The second group
was composed  of households  who remained beyond the poverty zone over the whole period  under study.
xii With exception of unemployment  benefit, the summary indicator is much lower than previously,
ranging from 0.037 for non-vulnerable  to 0.081 for vulnerable in the case when all social benefits were not
counted; in the case of  unemployment benefit it equal 0.136 and 0.292 for  non-vulnerable and vulnerable
recipients,  respectively,  and in the case of family benefits  the analogous  figures are only 0.028 and 0.032.
51xiv The specification comprises: (i) the concept of the household's poverty pattern over time and its
derivatives  - the time variable (the dependent  variable, in other words, the number of months that the household
remained in or outside of the poverty  zone); (ii) the status variable associated with the survival (time) variable,
with multiple destinations  for transition in and out of the poverty zone (in other words, poverty spell completed
or  right-censored); and  (iii) the  way of  dealing with the  problem of  behavioral response (by  stratifying
households by vulnerability status). Also, the differences in the cumulative hazard functions, A (H), and the
survival functions,  A (S), calculated for the cases "with" and 'withouf' social benefits  respectively, are used here
for measuring the  overall impact of a  social program on poverty status over time among the households
distinguished by characteristics that are traditionally of particular interest of social policy in Poland (such as
socioeconomic  groups or type of family.
xv  In the SPSS-Coxreg  program used here, the assumption  about the constant hazards ratio over time
between the sub-groups distinguished by vulnerability status was checked using the Nelson-Aalen estimator of
the cumulative hazard rate for both sub-groups (say, Z =1 if vulnerable and Z = 0 if not). If the proportional
hazards  model was correct, then, H(t  Z=I) =  e(t  I Z=0), so that a plot of  ln[Hl(t  l Z = 1)]  - ln[H1(t  l Z = 0] versus
t should be roughly equal  to P3.
xvi  The following  categories  of family  were defined:  I - married  couple  without  children;  2  - married
couple with I to 2 children;  3 -married couple with 3 or more children;  4 - other families with children (mostly
one-parent  families); 5 -other families without  children;  6 -single-person households.
xvii For instance, 56 percent of households reported participating in private transfers (either giving or
receiving) during the  1993-96 period, and 57 percent among the "never poor" reported  such transfers. The
analogous figures for public transfers (excluding pensions) were 79 percent in total and 77 percent among the
"never poor." For credits from banks, they were 61 percent and 62 percent respectively.  For borrowing money
from private sources,  they were 27 percent and 25 percent. Only in the case of possessing  a savings account did a
higher fraction of the never poor (56 percent) report  this than others (48 percent).
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Table A-1.  Poverty pattern frequency distributions under alternative definitions of
household consumption by adjusting it to income from social benefits.
Frequency distributions of  households by poverty status over time
Total  If not counted:
Poverty  pattern  over  four  consumption  All social benefits-  Consumption  Consumption
year period *  derived consumption a  derived from  derived  from
family benefits b  unemploymen
t benefit
C.)  000
1.  0 1 1 l  121  2.5  126  2.6  114  2.3  124  2.5
2.  0 0 1 1  108  2.2  115  2.3  109  2.2  128  2.6
3.  0 0 0 1  187  3.8  182  3.7  180  3.7  183  3.7
4.  0 0 0 0  3055  62.1  2609  53.0  2828  57.5  2851  58.0
5.  1 0 0 0  223  4.5  270  5.5  256  5.2  238  4.8
6.  1  100  98  2.0  137  2.8  127  2.6  110  2.2
7.  I 1 1 0  98  2.0  129  2.6  126  2.6  107  2.2
8.  1 1 1 1  288  5.9  510  10.4  399  8.1  356  7.2
9.  0 1 1 0  86  1.7  92  1.9  83  1.7  92  1.9
10.  0 1 0 0  156  3.2  161  3.3  160  3.3  163  3.3
11.  0 0 1 0  172  3.5  173  3.5  179  3.6  183  3.7
12.  1 0 0 1  81  1.6  83  1.7  76  1.5  84  1.7
13.  1 0 1 1  62  1.3  97  2.0  68  1.4  89  1.8
14.  1  1  0 1  85  1.7  99  2.0  94  1.9  90  1.8
15.  1 0 1 0  48  1.0  73  1.5  64  1.3  58  1.2
16.  0 1 0 1  51  1.0  63  1.3  56  1.1  63  1.3
Total  4919  100.0  4919  100.0  4919  100.0  4919  100.0
"I"  represents  a  year  in  poverty  zone  (in  I"5  quintile  by  household  consumption
expenditure per equivalent adult) and '0' represents a year out of poverty. a, b, c - an adjustment
factor for consumption derived from a given type of benefit was defined  as follow:  household
consumption  per  equivalent  adult x  (income  from benefit/total household disposable  income).
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Table A-2. Determinants of welfare change during 1993-96 --  fixed effect model of consumption  (for
assessing the propensity to consume out of social benefits)
Change in consumption expenditure:
1993-94  1994-95  1995-96
Coefficie  Std.  Coefficie  Std.  Coefficien  Std.
Variable  nt  Error  nt  Error  t  Error
(Constant)  -74.551  28.876*  -52.352  31.785  32.308  37.783
**  * 
Head elementary school diploma  11.906  11.415  -6.370  11.753  -1.364  14.046
Head vocational school diploma  13.113  12.275  -8.202  12.543  3.022  14.945
Head high school diploma  15.018  12.453  -3.481  12.664  .787  15.060
Head university diploma  -1.919  14.159  5.144  14.214  3.783  16.860
Total number of school years  -6.3 1E-2  .331  -.380  .323  .560  .384
Change in number of school years  -1.063  .375*  -1.001  .375*  -.970  .461  *
Age of head  2.557  .903*  2.622  .873*  -.508  1.015*
Age of head squared  -2.2 1E-2  .009*  -2.75E-2  .009*  6.532E-3  .010*
Number of adults women  .904  4.270  1.880  4.114  .801  4.753
Change in number of adult-women  -17.259  5.672*  -19.817  5.434*  -19.921  6.322*
Number of adults men  3.356  4.364  4.025  4.161  -4.866  4.890
Change in number of adult-men  -17.432  5.295*  -2.246  5.283  -22.162  6.444
Number of elderly  6.330  4.851  3.749  4.647  -4.764  5.448
Change in number of elderly  -5.745  7.492  -19.725  7.854*  -22.794  9.245  *
Housing amenities  2.817  5.670  24.156  6.004*  -8.100*  6.989*
Change in housing amenities  6.373  6.070  19.380  5.168*  3.540*  7.380*
Agricultural land area  1.215  11.804  -.319  10.914  1.216  9.956
Change in area of agricultural land  -1.943  11.663  -.476  10.727  3.950  8.678
Plot of land  -31.666  10.777*  -7.353  10.482  -.561  12.265
*
Change in plot of land  31.672  12.265*  4.462  11.708  4.742  13.893
*
Female head  6.056  4.272  -6.272  4.077  2.582  4.781
Social benefits  .297  .129*  -6.  35E-2  .127*  -.437  .159
Change in social benefits  .583  .094*  .675  .107*  .404  .128*
Head employed  -23.083  18.634  -2.012  22.573  -29.646  27.105
Head unemployed  -9.065  21.569  26.047  24.573  5.778  28.965
Head pensioner  -19.648  19.027  -1.613  22.786  -26.086  27.410
Change in head labor status  8.017  6.890  1.222  6.858  9.133  8.295
Head in public sector  1.143  4.550  -2.765  4.381  8.921  5.226
Change  of  head'  s  employment  -4.084  6.287  6.227  6.666  -3.533  7.810
sector
Big city  3.415  4.886  .469  5.812  9.555  6.835
*) Indicates  significance  at 0.05 confidence  level; **) Indicates  significance  at 0.10 confidence  level.
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Table A-3a.  The long-term poverty determinants - number of years in the poverty zone under
alternative definitions of consumption regressed on household head's  school years,
unemployment incidence in the household, number of children under 15, urban-rural
and region.
Variables  Full consumption  Not counted social  Not counted  Not counted
counted  benefits  unemployment  family benefits
benefits
(Constant)  1.876  2.269  1.860  2.174
(.167)  (.174)  (.164)  (.176)
School year of  -0.147*  -0.175*  -0.148*  -0.170*
HH head (93)  (.013)  (.013)  (.012)  (.013)
Unemployment  0.308*  0.588*  0.579*  0.334*
Years (all  (.029)  (.030)  (.029)  (.031)
Members
Nr. of children  0.316*  0.368*  0.300*  0.392*
under 15  (.026)  (.027)  (.026)  (.028)
URBAN  -0.205*  -0.145*  -0.181*  -0.192*
(.056)  (.058)  (.055)  (.059)
North East  -0.095  -0.082  -0.049  -0.081
(.129)  (.134)  (.126)  (.135)
North  0.327*  0.367*  0.326*  0.370*
(.114)  (.118)  (.112)  (.119)
South  0.008  0.020  0.045  0.007
(.100)  (.105)  (.099)  (.106)
South East  0.275*  0.359*  0.305*  0.353
(.102)  (.107)  (.101)  (.108)
Central East  0.464*  0.491  *  0.495  *  0.471  *
(.130)  (.135)  (127)  (.136)
Central  0.056  0.078  0.081  0.084
(.115)  (.120)  (.113)  (.121)
Central West  0.429*  0.492*  0.474*  0.452*
(.103)  (.107)  (.101)  (.108)
South West  0.250**  0.338*  0.279*  0.284**
(114)  (119)  (.112)  (.120)
R2adj  0.206  0.301  0.290  0.232
N (households)  4,919  4,919  4,919  4,919
*Indicates significance of 0.01 confidence level;  ** Indicates significance at 0.05 confidence level.
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Table A-3b.  Associations between the number of years in poverty zone and the number of years
during which household was receiving a given type of benefits, or was  taking money from non-
income sources of welfare, by type of residency and vulnerability status.
Number of years  1  Non-
receiving benefits  Total  Urban  Rural  vulnerable  Vulnerable
Values of  t -statistics
Social benefits
Any kind of  22.01  17.68  15.53  13.80  15.16
benefits
Family benefits  27.90  22.60  17.20  18.05  18.23
Unemployment  18.80  16.03  10.27  13.94  11.10
benefits
Local benefits  -1.93*  -0.49 n  0.092 n  -3.78  1.37n
Other benefits  5.22  5.41  2.11  4.10  3.00
Other sources
Dissaving  -12.78  -9.61  -6.87  -9.47  -7.54
Formal credit  -3.60  -1.66  -3.01  -2.40  -2.30
Infornal  credit  6.56  6.74  4.01  3.67  4.24
*) Significant  at 0.05; Unmarked  are significant  at 0.01; ) No significant
Table A-4.  Number of years in poverty zone regressed on the time period (number of years) of
receiving  a given  type  of benefit
Number of years
Receiving benefits  Total  Urban  Rural  Non-  Vulnerable
vulnerable
Constant  0.279  0.045  0.050  0.227  0.532
(.026)  (0.032)  (0.045)  (0.024)  (0.063)
Family benefits  0.259  0.239  0.288  0.157  0.369
(0.011)  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.010)  (0.023)
Unemployment benefit  0.289  0.289  0.257  0.217  0.334
(0.021)  (0.025)  (0.037)  (0.021)  (0.044)
'Local' benefits  -0.007  -0.002*  -0.009  -0.002  -.004n
(0.014)  (0.015)  (0.030)  (0.013)  (0.032)
Other benefits  0.159  0.193  0.002  n  0.129  0.210*
(0.055)  (0.062)  (0.100)  (0.053)  (0.110)
RL_adjusted  0.174  0.186  0.160  0.126  0.212
Number of households  4,919  3,036  1,881  3,393  1,524
* ) Significant  at 0.05  or 0.10; Unmarked  significant  at 0.01;.  n)  Not significant.
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Table B-la.  Duration of the poverty spell by the level of welfare dependency - the number of
social programs used by a household during the four year - and by locality.
Welfare dependency  Poverty spell duration: the median time of being in poverty zone
(in months)
Level  Fraction of  Poverty spell  completed  or  right  Left  censored poverty spell
recipients  censored
t  %  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural
None  20.6  21.7  21.8  21.0  24.4
Low  39.2  20.6  22.0  23.8  24.2
Medium  30.4  23.2  23.7  23.5  24.2
High  9.9  22.6  23.3  29.0  29.1
Total  100.0  xx  xx  xx  xx
Table  B-lb.  The poverty  spell duration  by the number of years  household  participated in
family benefits, and in unemployment benefits
t  ~~Poverty  spell duration:  the median  time of being
Program-  Fractions of  in the poverty zone  (in months)
duration  recipients  Family benefits  Unemployment benefit
dependency  Family  Unemplo
benefits  yment  Urban  Rural  Urban  Rural
benefit
None  25.6  57.9  21.6  21.4  21.3  22.5
One year  7.8  22.1  20.3  23.0  22.7  21.8
Two years  11.6  13.6  21.2  22.1  26.7  22.5
Three years  15.5  4.9  22.5  23.5  24.9  27.4
Four years  39.6  1.8  23.3  24.0  18.0  24.0
Total  100.0  100.0  xx  xx  xx  Xx
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Table B-2.  Impact of social transfers on poverty duration under alternative  definitions of
household consumption
Poverty  spell  duration:  the  median  time  of  being  in  poverty  zone  under
alternative definitions of household consumption (in months)
Full  If not counted:
consumption  All social  Family  Unemploy
benefits  allowances  ment compensation
Recipient  All  Recipient  All  Recipient  All
All households  22.3  26.5  26.0  25.4  23.5  28.8  23.8
Locality
Urban  22.0  26.8  26.7  26.7  23.4  30.1  24.0
Rural  22.5  26.0  25.3  25.3  23.5  27.1  23.6
Vulnerability_
Non-vulnerable  20.3  23.6  23.4  22.2  21.5  27.4  21.6
Vulnerable  25.7  29.1  28.6  28.7  26.5  29.6  27.3
Table B-3.  The impact of social benefits on remaining in prolonged poverty or on exitingthe
poverty zone: values of the survival function and the hazard rate.
Remaining in poverty under alternative definitions of household
Interval  consumption
start time  Total  If not counted:
consumption  All social benefits  Family benefits  Unemployment
benefits
;~~~  ~~~  tD  4e  $.  C  >mYe  e 
ct;  =  m;  =  M  U2 v  =  4  m  v  =x;v
0.0  1.00  0.000  0.91  0.006  0.93  0.006  0.92  0.007
12.0  0.41  0.069  0.66  0.034  0.55  0.043  0.71  0.028
24.0  0.33  0.084  0.45  0.063  0.22  0.071  0.40  0.072
36.0'  0.00  xx  0.05  xx  0.01  xx  0.01  xx
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Table B-4.  Preventative impact of social benefits on remaining outside the poverty zone -
the survival function, by the vulnerability status of households during 1993-1996.
Survival function under alternative definitions of household consumption
Interval  Total  If not counted:
consumption  All social  Family  Unemploy
start  benefits  benefits  ment benefits
time  i  - c  ci
Z, >  >  Z  >  >  Z  >  >  Z  > 
0.0  .000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000
(1.000)*  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)
12.0  0.924  0.826  0.900  0.765  0.895  0.779  0.821  0.624
(0.923)  (0.807)  (0.911)  (0.789)  (0.882)  (0.728)
24.0  0.873  0.707  0.838  0.631  0.838  0.645  0.696  0.377
(0.874)  (0.691)  (0.865)  (0.669)  (0.818)  (0.558)
36.0-7  0.847  0.605  0.804  0.534  0.805  0.548  0.630  0.239
(0.842)  (0.595)  (0.834)  (0.574)  (0.777)  (0.405)
Number  of  4,919  3,908  3,081  1,266
households  l  ll
* In parenthesis are values calculated for recipients only.
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Table Cl.  Hazard  function  for poverty  exit, under  alternative  definitions  of consumption  - the
proportional  hazard  model  estimates
Variables  Counting  If not counted
full
consumption  Family  allowances  Unemployment  benefits
Coefficients  Standard  Coefficients  Standard  Coefficients  Standard
Error  Error  Error
Head of Household
Age  -2.07E-04  .0041  3.367E-04  .0045  4.132E-05  .0043
Education
Elementary  or below  -.3802  .2529  -.4548  .2852  -.3649  .2560
Vocational  or some HS  -.3717  .2482  -.4277  .2809  -.3297  .2501
High  school  or some  college  -.3877  .2551  -.4416  .2884  -.3345  .2583
University  (omitted)
Female  head  .0404  .1163  .0153  .1269  .1188  .1234
Marital status
Never married  .2250  .2000  .1043  .2018  .0960  .2055
Married  .0272  .1106  .0011  .1193  .0245  .1152
Widowed  -.1358  .1650  -.2420  .1743  -.1836  .1702
Divorced  (omitted)
Family Type
Married  w/t children  .0085  .1996  .0310  .2129  .0234  .2026
Married  w/ 1-2  children  -.0542  1986  -.2026  .2087  -.1303  .2031
Married  w/ 3 or more  children  -.2402  .2175  -.4828*  .2374  -.2582  .2229
Other  with  children  -.1805  .1799  -.2471  .1879  -.2971*  .1839
Other  without  children  -.0428  .1696  -.0162  .1754  -.2046  .1730
Single-person  in HH (omitted)
Disabled  person in HH  -.0155  .0928  -.0081  .0982  -.0451  .0978
Head's employment sector
Public  sector  -.1140  .1196  -.0471  .1360  -.2529*  .1242
Private  sector  -.0897  .1065  .0054  .1182  1.1839*  .1105
Socioeconomic group
Employees  -.1362  .1521  -.0781  .1641  .0525  .1550
Farmers  and a mixed  group  -.1175  .1463  -.1566  .1559  -.0862  .1495
Self-employed  -.1311  .2292  -.1602  .2454  -.0117  .2330
Welfare  recipients  -.1648  .2475  -.2660  .2900  -.3872  .3162
Pensioners  (omitted)
Access to non-income sources and  transferparticipation
Possessing  savings  account  .0211  .1720  .0086  .2029  .0290  .1718
Credit  and loan  transactions  -.2280  .2977  .1072  .3925  -.1950  .2991
Participate  in private  transfers  -.0522  .1060  -.0375  .1204  .0866  .1082
Participate  in public  transfers  -.0988  .1120  -.2007*  .1160  -.0797  .1141
Poverty spell began
in 1995  -.5935*  .0911  -.6486*  .0935  -.6237*  .0902
in 1996  -1.1358*  .1114  -1.0810*  .1075  -1.0238*  .1066
in 1994  (omitted)
Cases  available  for the analysis  798  785  829
-2 Log  Likelihood  8671.679  7169.939  8083.290
Chi-Square df  Sig  Chi-Square df  Sig  Chi-Square df  Sig
Overall  (score)  130.099  25  .0000  143.845  25  .0000  132.348  25  .0000
*) Significant  at 0.10 level
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TABLE  C-2.  Hazard to poverty, under alternative definitions of consumption - the
proportional hazard model estimates
Counting  If not counted
full
consumption  Family  Unemployment benefits
allowances
Variable  Coefficients  Standard  Coefficients  Standard  Coefficients  Standard
Error  Error  Error
Head of Household
Age  -.0068  .0043  -.0062  .0043  -.0073*  .0041
Education
Elementary  or below  1.1900*  .2506  1.2445*  .2457  1.2023*  .2205
Vocational  or some HS  1.0347*  .2465  1.0772*  .2412  1.0008*  .2155
High  school  or some  college  .7218*  .2511  .7267*  .2455  .6178*  .2200
University  (omitted)
Female  head  .0154  .1134  -.0335  .1124  -.0578  .1102
Marital status
Never  married  .1059  .1996  .0460  .1920  .1926  .1953
Married  .0584  .1125  .0957  .1117  .0866  .1098
Widowed  -.1404  .1601  -.0988  .1615  -.1310  .1616
Divorced  (omitted)
Family Type
Married  without  children  .0194  .1995  .1649  .1992  .0325  .1946
Married  and 1-2  children  .2437  .2011  .4815*  .2000  .2936  .1939
Married  and 3 or more children  .8539*  .2182  .9762*  .2241  .8145*  .2124
Other  with  children  .5062*  .1776  .6403*  .1770  .5482*  .1725
Other  without  children  .1890  .1695  .2345  .1685  .2848*  .1656
Single-person  in HH (omitted)
Disabled  person in HH  .0459  .0912  .0570  .0905  .0806  .0886
Head's employment sector
Public  sector  .1273  .1178  .2782*  .1134  .3096*  .1131
Private  sector  -.0051  .1032  .1283  .1025  .1222  .1024
Socioeconomic group
Employees  -.0478  .1387  -.0532  .1405  -.263 *  .1360
Farmers  and  a mixed  group  .0131  .1341  -.0713  .1343  -.0648  .1334
Self-employed  .1739  .2194  .2232  .2226  -.1644  .2022
Welfare  recipients  .5070*  .2407  .1136  .2861  .8907*  .2859
Pensioners  (omitted)
Access to non-income sources and transfer participation
Possessing  savings  account  .2755*  .1643  .1906  .1523  .1996  .1456
Credit  and loan  transactions  -.2274  .2957  -.2149  .3231  -.1873  .2841
..Participate  in private  transfers  .4455*  .1051  .4732*  .1061  .3582*  .0968
Participate  in public  transfers  .1145  .1108  .1528  .1109  .0652  .1053
Poverty spell began
in 1995  -2.0499*  .0898  -1.9295*  .0917  -1.8439*  .0875
in 1996  -1.5085*  .1004  -1.4601*  .1022  -1.3866*  .1000
in 1994  (omitted)
Cases  available  for the analysis  3485  3274  3357
-2 Log Likelihood  10735.936  10532.981  11532.987
Chi-Square df  Sig  Chi-Square df  Sig  Chi-Square df  Sig
Overall  (score)  1177.007 25  .0000  1083.422  25  .0000  1019.938 25  .0000
*) Significant  at 0.10 level
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Figure  C-la.  Differences in Cumulative  Figure  C-la.  Differences  in Cumulative
Hazard  Function  with and without  Counting  Hazard  Function  with and without  Counting
Social Benefits for Poverty  Exit, by Region  Social Benefits for Poverty Entry,  by Region
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Figure C-2a. Hazard  to Poverty by the level  Figure C-2a. Hazard  to outside-poverty
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Figure  C-4a.  Hazard  to poverty by age of  Figure  C-4b.  Survival in poverty
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